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ABSTRACT 
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volunteer support niche through an agreement with the U.S. Air Force and to better 
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previous similar studies because it identifies long-term trends in volunteer activity and 
measures the return on investment in terms of organizational outcomes, not volunteer 
effort or opinion questionnaire. The literature review presents examples of similar 
affiliated or formal volunteer organizations found in the U.S. and abroad, several of 
which were originally modeled after the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary. The volunteer 
demographics and participation for the six major operational Auxiliary activities are then 
represented to identify trends. The Coast Guard’s resourcing in the form of full-time 
employee support and direct funding are also presented. The focus of this study is how to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the volunteer organization to the Nation; the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A total of 63.4 million American volunteers offered over 8.1 billion hours of 
service in 2010.1 A significant number of volunteers provided that service directly in 
support of government agencies tasked with fulfilling homeland security missions. 
Among those agencies, the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) administers over 
30,000 volunteers who offer services of an almost unlimited manner through their 
activities in the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (Auxiliary). While there are program 
successes, the proliferation of the various volunteer services offered also poses a growing 
challenge. At present, there is little Coast Guard organizational direction focusing the 
Auxiliary program missions on those that provide the greatest service; in practice, all 
volunteers are welcome and they are encouraged to serve in whatever capacity or duties 
they prefer—with limited consideration for the actual support needs of the Coast Guard 
or the resourcing required to manage those volunteers. As a matter of history, the 
Auxiliary program manager at Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC, also shared 
this concern over fifty years ago. On September 21, 1960, the Chief Director of the 
Auxiliary sent a memo to the Coast Guard’s regional Directors of Auxiliary that stated, 
“By statute–neither as expressed or [sic] by intent—was it desired that the Auxiliary 
encompass all marine related activities.”2 While volunteers generally provide a positive 
Return On Investment (ROI), meaning the “value” of the service they provide is greater 
than the resources required to support and manage them, volunteers are not without cost. 
Volunteer programs can at times require disproportionate organizational resourcing to 
                                                 
1 “Volunteering in America: Information on Volunteering and Civic Engagement,” Corporation for 
National and Community Service, (n.d.), http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/research-papers.cfm. 
2 Memorandum, Chief Director to Directors of Auxiliary, September 21, 1960, “Subject Memos/1960–
61” Folder CGAR National, quoted in John A. Tilley, The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History 
1939–1999 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 77. 
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support, offer a limited ROI, and/or pose considerable risk to either the volunteer in the 
form of personal safety, or to the organization in the form of legal liability.3 
There are a limited number of full-time Coast Guard employees dedicated to 
supporting the resource-constrained Auxiliary program. Over the past thirty years, there 
has been a trend of gradually decreasing staffing and expanding Auxiliary program 
activities. The program managers execute an increased administrative burden with a 
smaller staff. This has resulted in diminished programmatic oversight quality—that could 
result in decreased volunteer safety. Additionally, there has been no programmatic 
analysis in over a decade regarding what the Coast Guard actually needs of the Auxiliary, 
and how it should be administered.4 The missions of the Coast Guard have consistently 
grown and shifted in its history, most notably in the past decade; the mission tasking of 
the Auxiliary must be studied to determine in what areas the Coast Guard most needs, 
and can most efficiently employ Auxiliarists—and focus the Auxiliary program to those 
missions.  
Previous research identified declines in overall organizational membership and 
proposed methods to recruit and retain volunteers in the Auxiliary. Those studies failed to 
examine trends of more than several years, consider the reality of limited resources, or 
address the actual Coast Guard mission needs for those volunteers. Chapter IV, Data 
Presentation and Analysis, addresses the issue of the “alarming” membership trends 
presented in previous studies of the Auxiliary; in fact, the trends were actually short-term 
membership adjustments due to both Coast Guard policy updates and factors external to 
the Coast Guard. Coincidentally, the several previous Auxiliary studies described in the 
literature review occurred toward the end of a membership adjustment. As presented in 
                                                 
3 Linda L. Graff, “Structural Integrity: Retrofitting Volunteer Program Infrastructure: A Briefing Paper 
on Making the Case for Professional Management of Volunteer Programs, (n.d.), 2, 
http://www.lindagraff.ca/non%20html/Musing%20-
%20The%20Case%20For%20Investing%20In%20Volunteer%20Program%20Management.pdf. 
4 John A. Tilley, The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History 1939–1999 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office). Previous formal studies of the Auxiliary include the University Services 
Forum study of 1977, 114–117, a study ordered by the Coast Guard Appropriation Act of 1986 and 
performed by Development Procurement International in 1987, 140–143, and a study performed by active 
duty Coast Guard Officers and Auxiliarists in 1995, entitled “The Auxiliary Business Description and 
Direction,” 155–158. 
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this thesis, gross membership numbers in the Auxiliary is not the problem requiring 
attention; members have and will continue to join the Auxiliary. A quality volunteer 
organization will continue to draw interest. The problem is organizational resourcing, 
resourcing to both train and manage the volunteers who desire to honorably provide their 
services. 
It might be preferable to continue to permit—and appropriately support—
unconstrained membership growth and volunteerism mode diversity by the members of 
the Auxiliary, however, that is not practical. Even though the Auxiliary program 
consumes an insignificant portion of Coast Guard resources (0.24% of the Coast Guard’s 
annual budget),5 it is unlikely the Auxiliary will receive the additional personnel and 
funding to support this expansion. Historically, the Auxiliary program has not competed 
well in the budget cycle with the myriad other Coast Guard programs; there is no reason 
to believe that the Auxiliary’s future funding will increase. Therefore, a study must 
anticipate that no additional resources will be available to support any changes to the 
Auxiliary program. The likely outcome of a resource-neutral based analysis will be to 
reduce or end the performance of lower return, less critical Auxiliary activities in favor of 
higher-return, higher priority activities where the Coast Guard can best employ 
volunteers.  
After 50 years of primarily supporting recreational boating safety, one of the 
many diverse Coast Guard missions, The Coast Guard Auxiliary Act of 1996 replaced 
mission-limiting language in U.S. Code to explicitly state, “The purpose of the Auxiliary 
is to assist the Coast Guard as authorized by the Commandant, in performing any Coast 
Guard function, power, duty, role, mission, or operation authorized by law.”6 That is, the 
Auxiliary could now perform any Coast Guard mission, authorized by the Commandant, 
other than direct law enforcement and military operations. In practice, “authorized by the 
Commandant” in that code reference was interpreted as blanket approval. Essentially, any 
mission that was not specifically disallowed was allowed. This officially permitted—and 
                                                 
5 The Fiscal Year 2010 funding to the Coast Guard was $6.8B, of which $17.0M supported the 
Auxiliary program. “Auxiliary 101 Brief–March 2011–OMB-OIRA,” U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. 
6 Coast Guard Auxiliary Act of 1996, 14 U.S.C. § 822 (1996), 
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/14C23.txt.  
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has resulted in—a proliferation of widely varied non-recreational boating safety 
activities, each of which requiring specialized programmatic administration and oversight 
resources. Especially since September 11, 2001, Coast Guard leaders have permitted and 
encouraged the expansion of the Auxiliary mission scope, but have not increased the 
programmatic resourcing.  
The volunteers that comprise the Auxiliary bring a diverse set of skills and 
experience; some even receive national recognition for their contributions and 
innovation. There are opportunities for Auxiliarists to contribute greatly to existing and 
emerging Coast Guard mission needs. Throughout its history, the Coast Guard has 
gradually assumed additional, varied duties, to include the maintenance of aids to 
navigation (buoys and lighthouses), icebreaking, and the regulation of commercial 
shipping. These are in addition to the Coast Guard’s most widely known maritime safety 
and rescue missions.7 In the years following September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard grew 
and expanded various law enforcement and military oriented missions for which the 
Auxiliary is prohibited from participation. Additionally, the Coast Guard is increasingly 
relied upon to respond to, and lead, national efforts related to Incidents of National 
Significance, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Haitian earthquake and Deep Water 
Horizon Oil Spill of 2010, and the Midwest floods of 2011 to name a few recent events.  
This thesis studies the Auxiliary’s mission execution and membership trends, 
volunteer interest shifts within the Auxiliary, and present anticipated Coast Guard 
mission support resourcing needs appropriate to maintain its volunteer program. The 
intent of this study is to present a set of resource-neutral recommendations to re-focus 
the activities of the Auxiliary program to best meet the needs of the Coast Guard for the 
next 10 years—at which time a new study should be performed. 
                                                 
7 The 11 statutory missions of the Coast Guard fall into two categories: 1) Homeland Security 
Missions–Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Drug Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Defense 
Readiness, and 2) Non-Homeland Security Missions–Maritime Safety (this mission includes the 
Auxiliary’s primary duty, Recreational Boating Safety), Search and Rescue, Living Marine Resources, 
Environmental Protection, Aids to Navigation, Ice Operations, Other Law Enforcement. U.S. Coast Guard, 
“United States Coast Guard 2011 Posture Statement,” February 2011.  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Research Question 
How can the U.S. Coast Guard adapt the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary to better 
align its tasking and maximize volunteer support of Coast Guard Missions, within 
existing programmatic resourcing? 
2. Sub Questions 
 What Return on Investment do the existing Auxiliary sub-programs offer 
the Coast Guard? 
 In what Auxiliary program mission areas could the Coast Guard best 
leverage volunteer interests, skills, and participation in the next several 
years? 
 How can the existing U.S. Coast Guard resources allocated to support the 
Auxiliary program be adjusted to maximize its effectiveness? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research is significant because the Auxiliary program’s expanding mission 
portfolio, as well as the changing interests of the American volunteer demographic, are 
putting strain on the program’s resourcing—resourcing which has remained largely 
unchanged for over a decade. The consequence is an organization that is falling behind in 
its effectiveness; one could argue that the Auxiliary’s reputation is in decline. If these 
realities are not addressed soon, a result could be an Auxiliary organization that meets 
neither the needs of the Coast Guard nor the expectations of America’s volunteers. 
As the Literature Review presents, the Auxiliary is a volunteer organization that 
has similarities with some other volunteer organizations in its demographics, identity, and 
structure. The Auxiliary’s tasking and relationship with the Coast Guard, a military 
organization, is unique; there are no “simple” organizational comparisons or best 
practices that can directly apply. 
Of the Auxiliary’s stakeholders: Volunteer Auxiliarists, Coast Guardsmen who 
support and serve with Auxiliarists, U.S. citizens who are often the direct recipients of an 
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Auxiliarists service, and even senior Coast Guard Leadership, there are very few people 
who are aware of the program’s trends in service and resourcing. Auxiliary stakeholders 
have limited access to the broad organizational issues, and as will be noted later, 
significant portions of the Auxiliary’s historical information was not captured. Coast 
Guard leaders in recent history maintained an unofficial motto of “Do more with less.”8 
For the past 30 years, that is precisely what the Auxiliary program has done. It is time to 
present research that will enable Coast Guard leaders to make difficult choices regarding 
the Auxiliary program’s tasking and resourcing. The author found no evidence that either 
the Coast Guard or the Auxiliary has made any attempt to use actual resourcing and 
performance data in any of its programmatic decisions in the past 20 years. The analysis 
presented in this research aims to provide Coast Guard leadership with a comprehensive 
assessment of the Auxiliary program—that will facilitate informed decision-making 
about the future of the program. While a historical review of statistics does not directly 
identify future needs or address the changing and often-intangible human factors of 
leading a complex organization, the effort can identify trends and performance aspects. 
The Auxiliary program has no more “efficiencies to realize” in the status quo; it is the 
author’s opinion it is time to study and determine which sub-programs deliver the 
greatest return on investment, and concentrate available resources on those aspects of the 
program. This resource concentration must be done if the Coast Guard expects the 
Auxiliary to continue to perform in a meaningful fashion, especially if there is an 
expectation for continued expansion of the Auxiliary’s organizational mission. 
D. OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
This thesis is comprised of six primary Chapters. Chapter I introduces and 
provides a framework for the research. Chapter II offers a literature review of the 
overarching study of volunteer motivation and employment, and presents background 
information regarding other volunteer organizations that support various entities within 
                                                 





the homeland security enterprise, both within the United States and abroad. The literature 
review ends with a discussion of several previous studies regarding the U.S. Coast Guard 
Auxiliary. 
Chapter III reviews the method, the sources of the information to be presented, 
and an assessment of the quality of the data represented in this policy analysis, much of it 
numerical figures related to Auxiliary program participation, funding, and outcomes. The 
details of key assumptions and research limitations are listed in Appendix A. Chapter IV, 
Data Presentation and Analysis, presents and then expounds on the data by identifying 
trends and offering comparisons of the Auxiliary’s primary operational programs relative 
to: levels of volunteer interest and support, Coast Guard resourcing, outcomes, and 
resulting return on investment for each sub program. Fifteen specific findings are 
identified in this section and compiled again in Appendix C. Chapter V presents a 
discussion of findings and corresponding recommendations. Chapter VI is the conclusion 
with an overview, review, and final thoughts. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review seeks to assess the academic, government, and popular 
literature relating to American volunteerism and recent shifts in volunteerism principles. 
The review then examines the documentation relating to current volunteer programs that 
other U.S. and foreign government entities use to support their functions, in an attempt to 
identify best practices. 
Volunteering takes on various forms. In general, there are two primary categories: 
spontaneous volunteerism and formal or organizational volunteerism. A spontaneous 
volunteer is a person who has not been specifically recruited for a cause or assigned a 
task—also known as a “Good Samaritan.”9 An example is a person who witnesses an 
automobile accident and steps in to provide medical assistance to injured occupants. 
There is, in most instances, no particular expectation of reimbursement or reward, and the 
response is not planned or coordinated. Formal volunteerism “…is an activity which 
takes place through not for profit organisations [sic] or projects and is undertaken: to be 
of benefit to the community and the volunteer; of the volunteer’s own free will and 
without coercion; for no financial payment; and in designated volunteer positions 
only.”10 A formal volunteer affiliates with and is recognized by an organization. 
Examples include a “candy-striper” at a hospital, a volunteer fire fighter, or a volunteer 
member of Rotary International. This literature review addresses formal volunteerism 
only. 
A. WHY DO PEOPLE VOLUNTEER? 
Why do people offer their time, skills and/or resources toward a cause? A 
volunteer for a political party or a candidate’s campaign may be impassioned about a 
specific issue or concern. The same could hold true for volunteers who support agenda-
                                                 
9 Lauren S. Fernandez, “Volunteer Management System Design and Analysis for Disaster Response 
and Recovery” (PhD diss., The George Washington University, School of Engineering and Applied 
Science, March 2007), XI. 
10 “Definitions and Principles of Volunteering Information Sheet,” National Volunteer Skills Centre, 
Volunteering Australia, June 2005. 
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focused organizations: “NRA-ILA FrontLines [National Rifle Association Institute for 
Legislative Action] is comprised of NRA-ILA’s most dedicated volunteers who work 
vigorously at the local, state, and federal levels to defend our Second Amendment 
rights.”11 Beyond satisfying self-interests, why do people volunteer for organizations that 
support the general safety and security of their neighbors or their country as a whole, 
such as fire fighters, police auxiliary, or U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary? 
A simple Internet search of “why volunteer?” opens a door to a world of academic 
studies, discussions of motivations, and links to specific organizations seeking 
participants. The topic is well studied, with ample, yet differing, expert opinions. Some 
academic researchers, such as Susan Ellis of the University of Texas at Austin, simply 
attempt to list possible motivations.12 Others study chemical reactions in the brain, or the 
biological reward for altruistic behavior. One study, conducted by Bartley Hoebel of 
Princeton University, analyzed “…the role of endogenous opiates in altruism…”13 These 
studies address specific, yet diverse, individual motives; they have identified that while a 
desire to help others is usually primary, the direct or indirect personal return on that 
investment is what causes volunteers to continue serving.  
Non-technical discussions of volunteer motivation are also readily found. Most 
sources present “pride in service” as the primary driver; people simply have a sense of 
pride in their contributions to an organization or cause, and continue to offer them as long 
as they continue to achieve that sentiment. This common theme is also included in 
popular culture web sites, where organizations such as GenNext seek to recruit volunteers 
through the promise of “feeling good about oneself” for participation.14 Another driving  
 
                                                 
11 National Rifle Association, Institute for Legislative Action, (n.d.), 
http://secure.nraila.org/volunteer.aspx. 
12 Susan J. Ellis, “Why Volunteer,” ServiceLeader.org, (n.d.), 
http://www.serviceleader.org/volunteers/why. 
13 Bartley G. Hoebel, “The Neural and Chemical Basis of Reward: New Discoveries and Theories in 
Brain Control of Feeding, Mating, Aggression, Self-Stimulation and Self –Injection,” in Law, Biology and 
Culture, The Evolution of Law, ed. Gruter and Bohannan (Santa Barbara: Ross-Erikson, Inc., 1983), 111.  
14 “First Time Volunteers: GenNext & PRIDE gives HNHF Service Event,” YouTube video, posted 
by Christopher Ludlow, September 2, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05BRh0FS3AU. 
 11
motive for volunteers is after-the-fact recognition for the service. There are numerous 
volunteer recognition websites and forums that exchange suggestions for various types of 
formal and informal, public and private, recognition.15 
Organizations that administer volunteers must identify volunteer motives, and 
find ways to enhance that experience, personal return, or accomplishment in orders to 
promote continued support. Ironically, there is an entire for-profit industry of experts that 
specializes in volunteer motivation. These commercial firms can provide assistance to 
non-profit organizations to assist them in maximizing their effectiveness. For example, 
the American Red Cross, a non-profit organization, offers gifts for blood donors upon 
each event of blood donation. Additionally, a blood donor earns “points” that can be used 
online. “Exchange your points for prizes, including: Red Cross apparel, music 
downloads, and other items,” reads one website.16 It is reasonable to expect that a 
national and well-organized non-profit such as the American Red Cross has determined 
that promising “gifts” in exchange for voluntary blood donations is a fiscally sound and 
appropriate motivation technique—and that they sought the assistance of commercial 
marketing firms to identify products that will effectively encourage blood donation, at the 
minimum unit expense. Casual contact with one of these marketing firms, called Energize 
Inc., proved that they are reluctant to disclose their methods and customers, as it is 
proprietary.17 Today, recognizing and reinforcing volunteer motivation is an industry. 
B. TRENDS IN VOLUNTEER ACTIVITY OVER THE PAST SEVERAL 
DECADES 
Culture shifts over time. Different generations have distinct cultural norms that 
influence the activities in which people engage. Also, world events and technology 
greatly affect the form and frequency in which people volunteer. The various fields of 
American volunteerism include political, religious, and civic affiliation. There is ample 
                                                 
15 EnergizeInc., “Volunteer Recognition,” April 13, 2012, http://www.energizeinc.com/ideas.html. 
16 American Red Cross, “Red Cross Rewards,” (n.d.), 
https://www.membersforlife.org/arcpn/index2.php. 
17 Energize, Inc., “About Energize and Our Website,” (n.d.), 
http://www.energizeinc.com/ener/ener.html. 
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statistical information exhibiting how these activities have seen fluctuations in activity. A 
noteworthy book is “Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community,” by Robert D. Putnam.18 Published in 2000, this book discusses a general 
erosion of social capital in America and provides statistics to support trends in inter-
personal involvement among Americans. In very general terms, the reference cites a peak 
in citizen involvement in the early 1950s and several fluctuations over the following 
decades. Putnam co-authored a follow-up book three years later entitled, “Better 
Together: Restoring the American Community.”19 Unlike the original, this book focuses 
primarily on twelve success-stories in social connectivity and volunteer cooperation.20 
“Better Together” contributes less to the academic study and appears to offer a more 
optimistic viewpoint of where society is heading and how it could be improved.  
Aside from some books and scholarly studies that address a particular snapshot in 
time, the primary and most useful source of regularly updated statistical data addressing 
volunteer-related activity is the U.S. federal government. A principle reference is the 
Corporation for National and Community Service, which “…is a federal agency that 
engages more than five million Americans in service...”21 This agency offers dozens of 
federally supported research studies specifically related to volunteerism and service. For 
example, two research conclusions include “Individuals who volunteer live longer,”22 
and “A ‘class gap’ exists in teenage volunteering. The volunteer rate of youth from 
disadvantaged circumstances (DAC) is 16 percentage points lower than the rate for other 
youth (43% and 59%, respectively).”23 
                                                 
18 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000). 
19 Robert D. Putnam and Lewis M. Feldstein with Don Cohen, Better Together: Restoring the 
American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
20 Scott London, “Better Together: Restoring the American Community,” 2003, Book Review, 
http://www.scottlondon.com/reviews/putnam2.html. 
21 Corporation for National and Community Service, “About Us,” (n.d.), 
http://www.nationalservice.gov/about/overview/index.asp. 
22 Corporation for National and Community Service, “The Health Benefits of Volunteering: A Review 
of Recent Research,” April 2007, Issue Brief, http://www.nationalservice.gov/pdf/07_0506_hbr_brief.pdf. 
23 Corporation for National and Community Service, “Leveling the Path to Participation: Volunteering 
and Civic Engagement Among Youth From Disadvantaged Circumstances,” March 2007, Issue Brief, 
http://www.nationalservice.gov/pdf/07_0328_disadvantaged_youth.pdf. 
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The Bureau of Labor Statistics produces a monthly survey, the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), which is sent to 60,000 households. The Corporation for National and 
Community Service sponsors a volunteering supplement to that survey. The statistics 
captured in that report are more than simply reported; they are analyzed and 
demographically presented in a fashion that is of use to the study of volunteers. Examples 
include: women volunteer at a higher rate than did men; older volunteers [age 65 and 
older] are more likely to volunteer primarily for religious organizations; part-time 
workers are more likely than full-time workers to have participated in volunteer 
activities.24 
C. VOLUNTEERISM DEMAND …..HOW VOLUNTEERS ARE EMPLOYED 
TODAY 
While the traditional role of providing group manual labor for a good cause is 
often the primary mode of delivery for volunteer effort, the literature shows that the roles 
of volunteers are beginning to change.25 Again, the primary source that offers a broad 
accounting of volunteer activity is the U.S. federal government, in particular the 
Corporation for National and Community Service, which maintains a regularly updated 
statistical accounting of volunteer activities and organizations.26 
Other non-governmental literature seeks to assist organizations understand how to 
best harness volunteer talent and identify some best practices. David Eisner, et al, wrote 
an article describing a talent management approach to recruitment and identified The 
March of Dimes as a standout success story in the employment of volunteers, primarily 
because they measure and advertise the value of their volunteers’ service.27 
                                                 
24 Corporation for National and Community Service, “Volunteering in the United States, 2009,” 
January 26, 2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, News Release, 
http://www.nationalservice.gov/pdf/volunteer_study_09.pdf. 
25 David Eisner et al., “The New Volunteer Workforce,” Stanford Social Innovation Review, Winter 
2009, http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/the_new_volunteer_workforce. 
26 Corporation for National and Community Service, “Volunteering in America 2010 Fact Sheet,” 
(n.d.), http://www.nationalservice.gov/pdf/10_0614_via_2010_fact_sheet_6_10_10.pdf. 
27 Eisner et al., “The New Volunteer Workforce.” 
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Social media itself can be both a form of volunteerism and a research method in 
the study of volunteerism. The volunteer participation phenomenon of “crowd sourcing,” 
or presenting a problem to the public to collectively solve is an example. The 
“Wikipedia” online encyclopedia that was assembled, edited, and now maintained by 
volunteer subject matter experts, offers both definitions of volunteerism as well as links 
to volunteer opportunities.28 The relatively new Internet-based forms of volunteerism are 
beginning to be studied. In a blog posted by Ben Rigby, the concept called “micro 
volunteering” was differentiated from “virtual volunteering,” describing appropriate uses 
and outcomes of each.29 Technological advances are expanding the opportunities and 
tools available to support volunteerism; this could lead to increased volunteer 
participation, efficiency, and effectiveness in the future. 
D. HOW VOLUNTEERS ARE EMPLOYED ELSEWHERE IN THE 
HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE 
Numerous government entities responsible for homeland security, both in the 
United States and internationally, employ volunteers. The majority of available literature 
relating their missions, membership, and resourcing are readily available from the 
organizations themselves, frequently located in their websites. This readily accessible 
information is not actually literature as much as information, statistics, and facts. 
1.  U.S. Government-Supported Homeland Security Volunteer 
Organizations 
a. The Citizen Corps 
Numerous government entities responsible for homeland security employ 
volunteers. The Citizen Corps, which operates under the auspices of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), stands out as one of the largest national 
volunteer organizations. The Citizen Corps has no clearly defined role in the National 
                                                 
28 Wikipedia, “Crowdsourcing,” (n.d.), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdsourcing. 
29 Ben Rigby, “Why Microvolunteering Is Not Virtual Volunteering,” SparkedBlog, December 24, 
2010, http://blog.beextra.org/2010/12/why-microvolunteering-is-not-virtual-volunteering.html. 
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Preparedness System (NPS), nor does it have guiding policy that steers activity toward a 
particular measurable national goal. The clearest mission statement found read, “Citizen 
Corps is the FEMA’s nationwide grassroots strategy to achieve greater community safety, 
preparedness, and resilience.”30 There are presently 1,092 County and local/tribal Citizen 
Corps councils, representing 60% of the population.31 No statistics indicating the number 
of Citizen Corps volunteers could be found by the author. The Citizen Corps councils are 
relatively autonomous, often using information and materials presented from various 
government sources. Council activities reflect the interest of a particular council’s 
membership and leadership with no specific national tasking. The Fiscal Year 2010 DHS 
budget was $42.7B.32 From that budget, the Citizen Corps was funded $12.5M through 
the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), a $1.8B program.33 Less than 0.03%, or 
$1 out of every $3,416 of the DHS budget was devoted to supporting volunteer citizen 
activities in homeland security. FEMA does not directly report measurable advancements 
of homeland security due to Citizen Corps activity. While not fully measured, Citizen 
Corps members and affiliates throughout the country hold training sessions and share 
information related to community preparedness. The activities themselves, such as family 
emergency action plan training, appear to provide increased communication and 
connectivity between local government and citizens. 
b. The Civil Air Patrol 
The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) is a U.S. Air Force Auxiliary with over 60,000 
volunteer members. Its three primary mission areas are aerospace education, cadet 
programs, and emergency services.34 The first two missions relate to the goal of 
                                                 
30 citizencorps, “2009 Citizen Corps Annual Report,” 2009, 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/news/reports/Citizen%20Corps%202009%20Annual%20Report.pdf, 2. 
31 citizencorps, “Citizen Corps Councils Around the Country,” (n.d.), 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CouncilMapIndex.do. 
32 Office of Management and Budget, “U.S. Department of Homeland Security,” White House, The, 
(n.d.), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fy2010_department_homeland. 
33 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Homeland Security Grant 
Program (HSGP) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” (n.d.), 
http://www.fema.gov/txt/government/grant/2010/fy10_hsgp_faq.txt. 
34 Civil Air Patrol, “History of Civil Air Patrol,” (n.d.), http://www.gocivilairpatrol.com/about/. 
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recruiting and training future Air Force pilots. The third administers volunteer licensed 
pilots in performing operational missions (primarily search and rescue), for which the Air 
Force would otherwise have to use Air Force pilots and dramatically more expensive 
aircraft. About half of the members are “Cadets” and the other half are “Adult 
Volunteers.”35 The CAP reports that it flies more than 85% of all federal inland search-
and-rescue missions for the Air Force, rescuing nearly 100 people each year.36 Budget 
figures from 2006 state that of a total Air Force budget of $102.9B, $31.5M was allocated 
to the CAP program.37 In relative terms, 0.03%, or $1 out of every $3,332 funded to the 
Air Force, supports its volunteer program. The Civil Air Patrol is managed by 116 active 
duty and civilian Air Force members and 100 members of the Civil Air Patrol non-profit 
corporation.38 
c. U.S. Power Squadrons 
The U.S. Power Squadrons (USPS) is the largest non-profit recreational 
boater safety organization in the United States and has 35,000 members organized into 
450 squadrons.39 While having no government affiliation, the USPS has a very close 
working relationship with the Coast Guard Auxiliary, with approximately 6,000 people 
holding memberships to both organizations. The USPS missions include teaching 
recreational boater safety courses to the public, conducting courtesy vessel safety checks 
at the request of boat owners, and reporting maritime navigational and safety hazards to 
authorities, all of which are missions also performed by the Auxiliary.40 Funding for 
USPS activities is derived strictly from membership dues and proceeds from boater safety 
                                                 
35 USAF, “Factsheets: Civil Air Patrol,” January 21, 2011, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=163. 
36 Civil Air Patrol, “Emergency Services,” (n.d.), 
http://www.gocivilairpatrol.com/about/civil_air_patrols_three_primary_missions/emergency_services.cfm. 
37 Defense Industry Daily, “A National Bargain: The US Civil Air Patrol,” February 13, 2007. 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/a-national-bargain-the-us-civil-air-patrol-02016/. 
38 USAF, “Factsheets: Civil Air Patrol.” 
39 U.S. Power Squadrons, “About USPS,” (n.d.), http://www.usps.org/newpublic2/about.html. 
40 Ibid. 
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course fees. While not managed or funded by the government, the USPS plays an 
important role as a national participant in homeland security. 
2. International Volunteer Maritime Rescue Organizations 
There are many examples of volunteer activity in supporting safety and security in 
other nations. Again, one can readily find information on their organizational websites. 
There are quite a few organizations having missions that are analogous to the U.S. Coast 
Guard Auxiliary. 
a. The Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary (CCGA) 
The CCGA parallels the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary in its support for its 
parent agency, the Canadian Coast Guard. It focuses its members’ efforts strictly on 
maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), while U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliarists perform the full 
gamut of activities. With 4,000 members and 1,133 vessels, CCGA reported conducting 
1,741 search and rescue missions in 2010.41 The agency reports, “Because auxiliarists 
[sic] are only reimbursed for out of pocket expenses when tasked to a SAR mission, the 
Government of Canada receives the equivalent of $30 in services from the CCGA for 
every dollar actually spent. In other words, CCGA members save Canadian taxpayers 
millions by providing services at a fraction of the cost of maintaining the same number of 
Coast Guard units at the ready.”42 
b. The Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary (PCGA)  
The PCGA is also very similar to its Canadian and American counterparts. 
The mission of PCGA is “Assisting the Philippine Coast Guard in promoting safety of 
life and property at sea, protection of the marine environment, and other humanitarian 
                                                 
41 Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, “Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary Annual Review 2010,” (n.d.), 
http://www.ccga-gcac.org/publications/Annual_Review_2010-en.pdf. 
42 Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, “Running Costs,” (n.d.), http://www.ccga-
gcac.com/about/runningcosts_e.asp. 
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activities.”43 The efforts of PCGA’s members are focused strictly on independent actions, 
in support of safety and environmental protection; the volunteers do not integrate into or 
serve in direct support of active Philippine Coast Guard units. 
c. The Australian Volunteer Coast Guard (AVCGA)  
The AVCGA is a stand-alone all-volunteer organization (it is not an 
auxiliary to a full-time government organization) comprised of approximately 2,500 
members, organized into 65 flotillas with 100 corporate owned patrol vessels.44 The 
mission of the AVCGA is “…to enrol [sic] the owners and operators of vessels of various 
types, aircraft, radio bases, and other specialised [sic] equipment, these being termed 
“facilities” and to train and utilise [sic] them and their facilities to promote safety on the 
water.”45 The AVCGA mission is focused strictly on citizen safety and to execute 
rescues. 
d. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) 
The RNLI is an all-volunteer organization, independent of government 
management, and serves to support Her Majesty’s Coastguard in the United Kingdom, 
and the Irish Coast Guard in the Republic of Ireland. The missions of the RNLI include 
responding to Search and Rescue emergencies out to 100 nautical miles offshore, 
affecting inshore rescues, as well as providing beach lifeguard services. The RNLI is 
comprised of over 4,500 volunteer lifeboat crewmembers that man 330 lifeboats at 230 
lifeboat stations. The organization also has over 50 volunteer lifeguards and employs 
another 700 seasonal lifeguards at 140 United Kingdom beaches. RNLI reports that 84% 
of contributions go directly to operations; the other 16% is used to further generate 
voluntary income (donations). “Six of 10 launches are made possible by the kind 
                                                 
43 Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary, “About PCGA,” (n.d.), 
http://pcgauxiliary.org/aboutpcga/history.html#. 
44 Australian Volunteer Coast Guard, “Australian Volunteer Coast Guard Member’s Handbook,” 
(n.d.), http://www.coastguard.com.au/media/documents/Memb_Hbook_07.pdf. 
45 Ibid., 5.  
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supporters who leave bequests, large and small, in their wills.”46 RNLI has 1,300 
fundraising teams supporting its safety and rescue mission. 
e. Other International Volunteer Maritime Rescue Organizations 
(1) The German Maritime Search and Rescue Service 
(DGzRS). It reports, “186 full-time employees and more than 800 volunteers are on call 
on 20 rescue cruisers and 41 lifeboats. Fifty-four stations in the North Sea and Baltic Sea, 
on the mainland and the islands form a dense rescue network. All missions are 
coordinated by the central MRCC—Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre—in 
Bremen.”47 
(2) The Icelandic Association for Search and Rescue (ICE-
SAR). It is a both maritime and land-based volunteer search and rescue organization 
comprised of 3,000 volunteers, 150 lifeboats, and 14 all-weather boats, organized into 
about 100 teams. They also build and maintain a network of wilderness emergency 
shelters both on remote shores and in highland areas.48 
(3) The Maritime Rescue Service of the Netherlands (KNRM). 
It is another privately funded, all-volunteer organization that includes approximately 850 
volunteers who serve at 45 rescue stations.49 
(4) South Africa’s National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI). It 
includes 980 unpaid volunteers who operate 92 rescue craft at 32 coastal rescue bases.50 
(5) The Norwegian Sea Rescue (RS). It is also a self-funded 
volunteer corps comprised of 900 members who operate 16 boats.51 
                                                 
46 Royal National Lifeboat Institution, “Fact Sheet 2009,” (n.d.), 
http://www.rnli.org.uk/assets/documents/RNLI%20factsheets/RNLI_factsheet09.pdf. 
47 German Maritime Search and Rescue Service, “German-English Brochure,” Die Seenotretter, (n.d.), 
http://www.seenotretter.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Technikbroschuere2010.pdf. 
48 Slysavarnafélagid Landsbjörd, “ICE-SAR, A Tale of Great Achievements,” (n.d.), 
http://www.landsbjorg.is/category.aspx?catID=250. 
49 KNRM, The Royal Netherlands Sea Rescue Institution, “Maritime Rescue Service of the 
Netherlands,” (n.d.), http://www.knrm.nl/. 
50 National Sea Rescue Institute, “About Us,” (n.d.), http://www.nsri.org.za/about/. 
51 Redningsselskapet, “Norwegian Sea Rescue,” (n.d.), 
http://www.redningsselskapet.no/Om+oss/English. 
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(6) Swedish Sea Rescue Society (SSRS). It is also known by 
its literal translation “Swedish Maritime Rescue Service” and performs 70% of the 
nation’s search and rescue with 1,800 volunteers who serve at 66 stations and operate 160 
lifeboats.52 
(7) The (British) Virgin Islands Search and Rescue (VISAR). It 
was modeled after RNLI and operates two rescue boats, one based on Tortola, and the 
other Virgin Gorda. The organization’s motto is “VISAR saves lives at Sea.”53 
The reason for this rather lengthy list of foreign volunteer maritime rescue 
organizations is to demonstrate one worldwide commonality that sets the U.S. Coast 
Guard Auxiliary apart from all other similar organizations; all other identified volunteer 
maritime rescue organizations focus their membership’s training and responses solely on 
the mission of civilian safety at sea, through monitoring recreational boating activities 
and executing search and rescue missions. These other organizations do not integrate 
with non-volunteer government entities and do not perform their volunteer service in 
direct support of military units. 
3. International Non-Maritime Homeland Security Volunteer 
Organizations 
Other examples of volunteer participation in foreign non-maritime homeland 
security-related efforts include Germany and Israel. Homeland Security is used in the 
context of the U.S. definition, which includes ensuring public safety/emergency 
preparedness and crisis management, relating to both natural and man-made incidents. 
These two examples reflect the range of use of the term “Homeland Security.” 
a. Germany 
The German Federal Minister of the Interior reports that Germany’s 
emergency response system is based on volunteer commitment and is represented by 
                                                 
52 Sjöräddnings Sällskapet, Swedish Maritime Rescue Service, “Frivilliga Sjöräddare Sedan 1907,” 
(n.d.), http://www.sjoraddning.se/om-oss/. 
53 Virgin Islands Search and Rescue, “About VISAR,” (n.d.), http://www.visar.org/about/. 
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more than 1.2 million volunteer fire fighters and members of five volunteer 
organizations. Translated into English, these organizations are called: the German Red 
Cross, the Worker Samaritan Fund, the German Life Saving Company, the Maltese 
Emergency Service, and the Hoot Accident Assistance. “…with another 500,000 
volunteers, together with the 76,000 volunteers of the Federal Agency for Technical 
Relief. Germany’s emergency preparedness and response system would be unthinkable 
without the commitment of so many volunteers. Their efforts make an important 
contribution to security.”54 In addition to acknowledging the great number of volunteers, 
note the word “security” used in this quote; in this context, these agencies would be 
identified as contributing to “safety” in the American context of the word. 
b. Israel  
A standout among international volunteer participation in homeland 
security-related efforts is Israel. The Israel Civil Guard is a homeland security-focused 
volunteer organization that supports the Israel Police, a national police force. There are 
over 70,000 members, with most fulfilling the role of “Civil Guard Volunteer,” unarmed 
citizens “...engaged in the prevention of terror acts and crimes.”55 Other volunteer 
members are given specialized training in specialties such as diver, border guard, or 
bomb disposal; they are issued police uniforms, and some carry firearms.56 This is an 
altogether stand-alone aspect of volunteer involvement in homeland security and is the 
only example found where unpaid volunteers are placed on the “front-lines” of anti-
terrorist security. These volunteers are trained in relatively hazardous fields (bomb 
disposal?), and given the authority to carry out related missions, with some authorized to 
use deadly force if necessary.  
                                                 
54 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Civil Protection and Crisis Management,” (n.d.), 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Sicherheit/BevoelkerungKrisen/bevoelkerungkrisen_node.html#doc4
40498bodyText1  




The nation of Israel exists in a much different state of homeland security 
and exposure to terrorist threats than the United States; terrorist events are a regular 
occurrence in Israel, and the acceptance of armed volunteers in its support is tolerated by 
its citizens to a much greater extent than would be generally tolerated in the United 
States. While there is no federally supported equivalent to the Israel Civil Guard in the 
U.S., this research identified The New Mexico Mounted Patrol where volunteers are 
trained and deputized—and armed—to support state and local law enforcement officers. 
The organization’s website indicates, “Troopers have been working beside local and state 
police agencies during snow storms, State Fairs, rodeos, plane crashes, hazardous 
material spills, prison riots, pursued escaped felons, the anti-war riots in Albuquerque, 
and every weekend assisting agencies with the daily police duties. Troopers even went to 
New Orleans after Katrina.”57 Based on the author’s research, the state of New Mexico 
statute that permits uniformed volunteer law enforcement shows that there is at least one 
location in the U.S. where potentially armed volunteer law enforcers are permitted; others 
are likely—but not at the national level.58 
As previously mentioned, the literature regarding other governmental 
homeland security oriented organizations is easily found and of great utility to this thesis; 
these organizations are often measured by their parent agencies and governments, and 
offer a basis of comparison for studying best-practices and efficiencies. The root motives 
and affiliations of those specific volunteers were not sought, as only a general overview 
of American volunteer activity is necessary for this research. 
These are a few examples of how volunteers are used in support of 
homeland security in the United States and several other countries. A common theme 
runs across nationalities: the parent nation is better prepared for threats and emergencies, 
more responsive to actual events, and generally more “secure” due to the activities of the 
volunteers. Also noted by various organizations in their informational material, but 
oftentimes difficult to quantify, is that the return on investment of volunteer efforts is 
                                                 
57 The New Mexico Mounted Patrol, “Home,” (n.d.), http://nmmountedpatrol.com/. 
58 State of New Mexico Statutes, Chapter 29, Article 6, describes the establishment, duties, and 
membership requirements for the New Mexico Mounted Patrol. Laws.com, “Article 6–New Mexico 
Mounted Patrol, 29-6-1 through 29-6-6,” (n.d.), http://statutes.laws.com/new-mexico/chapter-29/article-6. 
 23
greater than one-to-one. Another observation is that the volunteers described in the 
aforementioned examples typically do not integrate with full-time paid workers, and 
except for Israel, perform solely humanitarian or other rescue duties. Volunteers who 
participate in activities in support of homeland security (their mission) deliver more value 
than then the raw resources required to support them. 
4. Recent Studies of U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary 
The literature review revealed three formal (U.S. Government commissioned) 
studies of the Auxiliary, in 1977, 1986, and 1995, and two more recent academic studies 
in 2006 and 2008. 
a. 1977, University Services Forum Study 
A study was commissioned by the Coast Guard in 1976 in which 
approximately 2,000 Coast Guard and Auxiliary members filled out questionnaires. The 
study determined that the Auxiliary was a professional and economic resource for the 
Coast Guard. It went on to recommend expanding the ranks of the Auxiliary to support 
the then growing recreational boating activity.59 
b. 1987, Development Procurement International Study 
A study was ordered by the Coast Guard Appropriation Act of 1986 and 
performed by Development Procurement International in 1987. This study performed a 
questionnaire among current and former Auxiliarists in an attempt to identify reasons as 
to why volunteers would choose to leave the Auxiliary. The study determined that recent 
enrollment declines were “natural” and “temporary,” but the Coast Guard should seek to 
maintain Auxiliary membership growth at 3% per year in order to accommodate growth 
in American Recreational boating.60 
                                                 
59 Tilley, The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History 1939–1999, 114–117, quoted on the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s Auxiliary Program Management Office website: 
http://www.uscg.mil/auxiliary/administration/aux-history.asp.  
60 Ibid., 140–143. 
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c. 1995, “The Auxiliary Business Description and Direction” Study 
This study, partially performed by Coast Guard Officers and Auxiliarists, 
determined that the permitted duties of the Auxiliary should be expanded to permit direct 
support to the Coast Guard. Federal code was changed the next year to permit activities 
beyond those of just recreational boating safety. This study is key in the timeline of 
events leading up to the basis of this thesis. This is the point in time that marked the 
beginning of the “proliferation” of Auxiliary activities.61 
d. 2006, “Can the U.S. Coast Guard Survive in the 21st Century” 
Study 
Commodore Fred Gates, a senior Coast Guard Auxiliarist, championed a 
study in 2006 entitled, “Can the U.S. Coast Guard Survive in the 21st Century: How 
changing generational attitudes will affect an all-volunteer organization.”62 That study 
primarily examined four major generations (Silent Generation, Baby Boomer, Gen X, 
Gen Y) and presented cultural generalities or norms among them. The study drew 
conclusions regarding volunteer interest and motivational needs similar to other studies; 
the volunteers of the younger generations are less interested in regularly scheduled 
camaraderie events and are more likely to engage in short-duration activities that also 
support personal and professional growth.63 
e. 2008, “Enhancing Recruitment and Retention of Volunteers in 
the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary”  
Lieutenant Matt Dooris, a Coast Guard Officer and 2008 Naval 
Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security graduate authored 
“Enhancing Recruitment and Retention of Volunteers in the U.S. Coast Guard 
                                                 
61 Tilley, The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History 1939–1999, 155–158. 
62 Fred Gates, “Can the U.S. Coast Guard Survive in the 21st Century: How Changing Generational 
Attitudes Will Affect an All-Volunteer Organization,” August 2006. 
63 Ibid., 20. 
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Auxiliary.”64 Lieutenant Dooris’s thesis argument was that Auxiliary membership was 
steadily decreasing due to Auxiliarist unhappiness and that the Coast Guard should take 
action to reverse the trend. He proposed administering the Coast Guard Organizational 
Assessment Survey to Auxiliarists to identify what may support improved retention. The 
overriding focus of this thesis was that the decreasing membership was a grave problem. 
It reflected a snapshot in time of the overall organization when Auxiliary membership 
numbers were declining, after an enormous uptick immediately post-9/11; members 
joined, but some soon left after the patriotic surge settled. At the conclusion of Mr. 
Dooris’ thesis, he wrote, “Further study of innovative volunteer management practices 
and recruitment strategies must be pursued to improve and strengthen the ranks of the 
Coast Guard Auxiliary on a continuing basis.”65 This thesis addresses that sentiment. 
One aspect that is conspicuously absent in this review is literature 
regarding organizational attempts to (re) focus the support provided by, or to find 
efficiencies in the resourcing of, volunteers by a parent organization. It appears that other 
organizations either fully resource and provide support to the wide array of volunteer 
activities—and have no resourcing concerns, or they refrain from openly sharing their 
experience with volunteer resourcing issues. Volunteers and volunteerism can be a 
sensitive topic. It is possible that few organizational leaders wish to qualify or quantify 
limits to their financial support of volunteers for fear of appearing unappreciative of 
volunteer efforts, or otherwise discouraging their affiliation and participation. 
                                                 
64 Matthew Dooris, “Enhancing Recruitment and Retention of Volunteers in the U.S. Coast Guard 
Auxiliary” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
65 Ibid., 149. 
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III. METHOD 
A. METHOD—POLICY ANALYSIS 
The research sub-questions seek to clarify the Auxiliary’s return on investment, 
the direction of volunteer support of the Coast Guard, and how to optimize existing 
programmatic resources. A policy analysis of Coast Guard Auxiliary volunteer activities 
and programmatic resourcing was performed (programmatic funding, and direct support 
by paid Coast Guard employees assigned to manage the Auxiliary full-time), based on 
primary data and existing Coast Guard organizational documents. The policy analysis 
measured a present day return on investment of primary Auxiliary sub-programs and 
presents the Auxiliary’s current demographics and trends in volunteer activity, in order to 
identify general shifts in volunteerism. In today’s challenging budgetary cycle, many 
federal agencies—including the Coast Guard—are redoubling their efforts to measure 
performance, identify any and all opportunities to trim expenses, and optimize outcomes. 
This information should assist Coast Guard planners to better understand the Auxiliary 
program’s capability to maintain current missions and/or take on future missions. 
As discussed in the literature review, formal studies of the Auxiliary missions 
were performed in 1977, 1986, and 1995.66 Those studies reviewed the desired size, level 
of professionalism, and general mission-set of the Auxiliary, as well as volunteer 
satisfaction with the organization. However, those same studies did not review the 
program’s actual cost to the Coast Guard. They also did not study the demographic and 
mission area participation trends of the Auxiliary’s volunteers. Several more recent non-
Coast Guard directed studies discussed in the literature review touched on short-term 
trends, suggested member unhappiness, and indicated a need to placate the members in 
order to sustain programmatic viability. During the past decade, the resourcing status quo 
has been maintained, and membership activity has been sustained; this indicates that 
placation, as suggested in the previous Auxiliary studies, may not be necessary—that 
                                                 
66 Tilley, The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History 1939–1999, 114–117, 140–143, 155–
158. 
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volunteers continue to join and serve in the Auxiliary despite some documented 
complaints. This analysis uses Coast Guard records, data, and documents to identify the 
current level of resourcing assigned to support the largest and most resource-dependent 
operational Auxiliary programs. In this context, “operational” means that a volunteer’s 
participation in the activity directly assists the Coast Guard in performing one of its 
statutory missions. The operational sub-programs are the Auxiliary’s raison-d’être and 
represent the primary deliverables or fruits of the overall Auxiliary program.  
The literature review indicated that a case study for volunteer resourcing 
optimization is not readily available. Additionally, the modeling technique does not apply 
itself to comparing the aspects of existing volunteer activities and desired volunteer 
support.  
A policy analysis was chosen because the Auxiliary programmatic resourcing and 
tasking is not fundamentally broken, and there is no clear standout flaw or issue to be 
addressed. It is anticipated that there are opportunities to increase the Auxiliary’s overall 
mission support to the Coast Guard and to improve the organization’s strategic 
placement, while also considering the appropriateness and cost of those opportunities. 
The present austere federal budgetary environment, an environment in which the Coast 
Guard even “taxed” the already minimal resourcing of the Auxiliary program, requires 
this assessment.67 Acknowledging the constrained resourcing, Coast Guard leadership 
should be presented with information regarding the costs and benefits of current and 
potential Auxiliary activities—information necessary to make policy decisions regarding 
the Auxiliary. 
Assuming a resource-neutral approach—e.g., no additional organizational support 
in the form of full-time Coast Guard employee staffing or Auxiliary programmatic 
funding—this study:  
                                                 
67 “Taxing” is a process by which various levels of Coast Guard leadership harvest resources (people 
and money) from subordinate commands to support other priorities. The Auxiliary program management 
division at Coast Guard Headquarters (CG-BSX-1) was “taxed” in January 2012, resulting in the permanent 
reduction of its staff from eight to seven and a five-percent reduction of its office budget ($53,000). 
Stephen J. Minutolo (CG-BSX-1 Chief of Administration Branch), in discussion with the author on January 
25, 2012.  
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 Assess the costs and contributions attributable to existing Auxiliary 
operational sub-programs;  
 Discusses statistical trends in Auxiliary volunteer demographics and 
support for Coast Guard missions;  
 Attempts to identify current Auxiliary volunteer activity interest—through 
quantitative analysis of actual activity versus qualitative questionnaire; 
and 
 Presents a recommendation to implement a change to the Auxiliary 
program to increase return on investment, improve contingency readiness, 
and to better align with Coast Guard mission-support needs over the next 
several years.  
B. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
A key assumption in this study is there is no room to further “optimize” general 
Auxiliary programmatic overhead expenditures. This study does not examine the 
approximately 53% of the Coast Guard expenditures attributed to General Auxiliary 
Administration (see “Coast Guard Resourcing of the Auxiliary Program” in Chapter IV 
for a programmatic resourcing breakdown). This general “overhead” expenditure 
supports recruiting, administering, encouraging, and training volunteers for general 
participation in the Auxiliary and integration with the Coast Guard organization. 
Following several years of inflation with no funding increases and other benefactor 
programs ending financial support to the Auxiliary, the program has already likely 
“optimized” its non-operationally directed expenditures.68 
Two elements of Auxiliary program resourcing were placed squarely in the 
category of General Auxiliary Administration in order to facilitate and simplify the 
analysis; they include the $2.7M presently distributed among the 14 regional Director of 
Auxiliary offices, and the $870K attributed to the salaries of the seven full-time Coast 
Guard employees who comprise the Auxiliary Program Management Office (CG-BSX-1) 
                                                 
68 “Taxing” is a process by which various levels of Coast Guard leadership harvest resources (people 
and money) from subordinate commands to support other priorities. The Auxiliary program management 
division at Coast Guard Headquarters (CG-BSX-1) was “taxed” in January 2012, resulting in the permanent 
reduction of its staff from eight to seven and a five-percent reduction of its office budget ($53,000). 
Stephen J. Minutolo (CG-BSX-1 Chief of Administration Branch), in discussion with the author on January 
25, 2012. 
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at Coast Guard headquarters. A portion of the distributed funding and a portion of the 
headquarters staff time are actually spent supporting the studied operational programs. A 
closer and more complicated analysis that breaks down these two elements completely 
would likely reduce the resourcing attributed to General Auxiliary Administration to less 
than 50%, but would likely make little to no change in the proportional resourcing of the 
studied programs. An accurate comparison of the relative resourcing requirements of the 
studied sub-programs, rather than the precise dollar figure, is the goal of this effort. 
Another significant and even more impactful assumption in this study is that it 
does not attempt to identify or study the millions of dollars that indirectly or tangentially 
support Auxiliary programmatic activities contributed from other Coast Guard programs. 
The regional Auxiliary programmatic support provided by various Coast Guard 
Operational Commanders is also not covered by this study. Additionally, thousands of 
Coast Guard personnel, outside of direct full-time Auxiliary program management roles, 
most likely spend on the order of a million man-hours training, supporting, and working 
alongside Auxiliarists. This study only analyzes Coast Guard resources specifically and 
directly attributed to the Auxiliary program; to include a study of indirect funding and 
full-time equivalent salary expenditures would require a Coast Guard wide survey and 
would divert thousands of man-hours away from the Coast Guard’s important missions. 
These significant contributions—which likely dwarf the actual direct Auxiliary 
programmatic resourcing being studied—are acknowledged, but will not be included in 
this analysis because the Coast Guard makes organizational decisions based on 
programmed resourcing, not indirect support. 
In the early 1960s (the precise date was not identified), the Coast Guard 
authorized the Auxiliary to file and maintain a non-profit “501(c)3” tax-exempt 
organization. The volunteer leaders of the Auxiliary are also on the board of the tax-
exempt “Coast Guard Auxiliary Association, Incorporated” (Aux Inc.). The stated goal of 
the organization is “Supporting the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary in promoting boating 
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safety including educational, outreach, and other activities.”69 A significant portion of 
individual Auxiliary member annual dues end up in the coffers of Aux Inc; Aux Inc. 
reported just over $390K from membership dues alone on its 2010 tax return, filed on 
October 31, 2011. Over $1M is annually brought in and dispersed through Aux Inc. 
activities. Auxiliarists (de facto members of Aux Inc.) are encouraged to view that tax 
return on the Auxiliary Association web site. In addition to funding corporate expenses 
such as travel for the board and senior members ($289,672 travel expenses were reported 
on the 2010 tax return), Aux Inc. also funds some expenses that would otherwise 
necessarily be funded by the Coast Guard. Similar to the indirect support provided by 
other Coast Guard programs, the support provided by Aux Inc. is acknowledged but not 
included in this analysis.70 
Additional specific assumptions and limitations key to this study are found in 
Appendix A—Research Method Data Assumptions and Limitations. These assumptions 
and limitations are articulated to assist future researchers seeking to use the data 
presented herein for other purposes. It is important to keep in mind that this study 
analyzes and compares Auxiliary sub-programs to one another; the assumptions and 
limitations of the data should be considered if the intent is to apply the data differently.  
                                                 
69 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Association, Incorporated website. The stated purpose is indicated at 
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. AUXILIARY PARTICIPATION 
1. Major Auxiliary Activities—FY 2011 
Fiscal year 2011 (October 01, 2010 through September 30, 2011) was specifically 
studied as representative of the present state in the Auxiliary program. Trends in 
volunteer activity were also reviewed. The number of volunteers and the number of hours 
they self-reported participating in each Auxiliary program was collected directly from the 
AUXINFO database.  
The six largest operational activities of the Auxiliary program—those with the 
most participants and logged the most volunteer service hours—were identified and 
reviewed, keeping in mind the end goal of measuring return on investment and direct 
contribution to the success of the Coast Guard. These six activities encompass most of 
the Auxiliary’s operational activities. They also represent the majority of volunteer 
participation and required Coast Guard resourcing. Numerous other activities exist, but 
they are either Auxiliary membership-centric (no measurable organizational outcome in 
support of Coast Guard missions) or require negligible resourcing; the other activities 
were, therefore, not studied. 
The volunteer members of the Auxiliary self-report their activities through their 
local organizational element called a flotilla, which normally ranges in size from 20 to 30 
people. There are approximately 1,000 flotillas in the Auxiliary at any given time 
(flotillas are regularly formed and disbanded). Member activities, the time duration 
attributable to each activity, and the direct outcome (e.g., vessels examined, students 
taught, property or lives saved), is recorded through a Coast Guard owned Internet-
accessed program called AUXDATA. This program, brought online in mid-2002, 




hours served and reported results of that service. AUXDATA forwards reported 
information, scrubbed of any personal information, to another Internet-accessed program 









Hours “AUXINFO” Category 
Internal Auxiliary 
Admin 3,458,868 71.2% RBS (99), MT, CGADMN 
1) Surface 
Operations 
Support (Boat) 473,779 9.7% 
Includes AUXMP, SAR, MS, 
MEP, and GOVSUP hours 
2) CG Unit Support 249,906 5.1% CGOPS 
Public Affairs 180,241 3.7% UPA 
3) Public Education 115,066 2.4% UPE 
4) Marine Safety 105,986 2.2% MS 
5) Vessel 
Examination 100,525 2.1% VSC 
6) Air Operations 
Support (Aircraft) 52,382 1.1% 
Includes SAR, AUXMP, MS, 
ICE, MEP, and GOVSUP 
hours 
All Other Activities 124,403 2.5%   
        
FY 2011 Total 4,861,156 100.0%  
Note: The numbered activities, also referred to as sub-programs, are the six studied for return on 
investment and are described below. 
Table 1.   FY 2011 Major Auxiliary Activities72 
The six largest, most resource-dependent, operationally oriented Auxiliary 
activities described in the Auxiliary Manual and captured in AUXDATA, are denoted 
with an asterisk (*) in Table 1. “Public Affairs,” as indicated in Table 1, was not 
reviewed because while about 6,000 hours (of 180,000 hours) were devoted to actual 
                                                 
71 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary statistical information captured in AUXINFO is openly available at 
https://www.auxinfo.uscg.gov/cognos/cgi-bin/upfcgi.exe . 
72 AUXINFO, Online Database, (n.d.), https://www.auxinfo.uscg.gov/cognos/cgi-bin/ppdscgi.exe. 
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Coast Guard Public Affairs augmentation, the overwhelming majority of the time in this 
category (approximately 97% of “Public Affairs”) is attributable to Auxiliary-centric 
projects such as flotilla website maintenance, member publication writing, and event 
participation.73 Additionally, while some Coast Guard resources are expended to provide 
formal public affairs training to Auxiliarists, it is to a lesser degree than most of the six 
other activities.  
As represented in Table 1, 75% of the volunteer hours performed in fiscal year 
2011 consisted of internal Auxiliary activities (includes public affairs). These activities 
represent Auxiliary organizational meetings, training, and social events, but also include 
Auxiliary self-management—Auxiliarists providing counseling to other members, 
preparing and processing awards and recognition, conducting investigations, and record 
keeping. The performance of actual Coast Guard support duties represents approximately 
25% of an average Auxiliarist’s time. This is not necessarily indicative of inefficiency; it 
is likely to be similar to even non-volunteer organizations with similar duties. Consider 
any profession: There is a considerable amount of time normally dedicated to training, 
administration, and other supportive or preparative activities. While the Auxiliary spends 
the majority of its time performing internal activities, these activities incur only minor 
expense to the Coast Guard and are necessary to prepare the volunteers to perform their 
operational duties with the high levels of safety and professionalism expected of them. 
Additionally, Auxiliarists report all of their organizational activities, even attending 
recreational events such as barbeques and holiday parties; the fellowship and camaraderie 
that bonds volunteers is often what keeps them volunteering. If one were able to isolate 
the reporting of fellowship events among the three AUXINFO categories that comprise 
Internal Auxiliary Administration, it would greatly increase the reported relative 
percentage of time performing operational support duties. 
 
 
                                                 
73 AUXINFO, Online Database. 
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The six Auxiliary activities studied comprise almost 23% of that service 
providing 25%, or 92% of all operational activities. Included in the 8% not being studied 
are the efforts of Auxiliarist radio operators, interpreters, and doctors, to name a few. 
These unstudied activities are limited in Auxiliarist participation, Coast Guard resourcing 
demands, and large-scale Coast Guard organizational outcomes. 
The major Auxiliary operational activities identified in Table 1, in decreasing 
order of volunteer participation are: 
1. Surface Operations Support—Auxiliarists, using Coast Guard approved 
personally owned boats, and occasionally Coast Guard owned boats, 
directly support Coast Guard operations. These activities include 
observation and safety patrols on the water, and are often in support of 
major public boating events such as regattas or summer holiday weekends. 
2. Coast Guard Unit Support—Many Auxiliarists are trained and then 
permitted to assist and work directly alongside Coast Guard members at 
operational units, performing duties normally and otherwise conducted by 
Coast Guardsmen, civilian employees, or contractors. Limits regarding 
permitted Auxiliarist activities, to include a specific exclusion from 
participation in law enforcement activities, prevent the volunteers from 
engaging in otherwise unauthorized and inappropriate activities. 
3. Public Education (PE)—In support of RBS, Auxiliarists offer boating 
fundamentals and safety oriented classroom instruction to the public. 
There is usually a nominal charge for the courses to offset training 
materials expenses and to assist with other local Auxiliary expenses. 
While some jurisdictions require that a boater must complete a boating 
safety course, there are many course providers; the Auxiliary is one of 
them. 
4. Marine Safety—Also referred to as “Prevention,” the Marine Safety field 
is a major Coast Guard mission area which employs a large number of 
Coast Guardsmen and actually encompasses three of the Coast Guard’s 11 
statutory missions: Marine Safety—ensuring the safety of ships and 
navigation, Marine Environmental Protection—preventing and responding 
to environmental hazards (e.g., oil spills), and Ports Waterways and 
Coastal Protection—ensuring the physical security of marine terminals 
and shipping access to U.S. ports. Some Auxiliarists complete technical 
qualifications and training, and go on to assist Coast Guard regulators in 
the enforcement of federal shipping and environmental protection law. 
Auxiliarists have no regulatory authority. 
5. Vessel Examination (VE)—In support of recreational boating safety 
(RBS), Auxiliarists offer courtesy (free of charge and attribution-free) 
Vessel Safety Checks (VSCs) to the public, where trained volunteers 
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examine a public participant’s watercraft to identify hazards and to verify 
the presence of Coast Guard required safety equipment. A passed VSC 
earns the public participant a decal indicating the year the vessel passed 
the VSC. VSCs are not regulatory or enforcement in nature; their goal is 
simply to promote RBS. 
6. Air Operations Support—Auxiliarists, using Coast Guard approved 
personally owned aircraft conduct aerial observation flights and logistical 
missions. Coast Guard Flag Officers (Admirals) are regularly shuttled to 
various locations using Auxiliary aircraft as the mode of transport. 
2. Historic Trends in Auxiliary Participation 
a. Total Auxiliary Membership 
The Auxiliary originated in 1939 and was originally referred to as the 
Coast Guard Reserve, until the actual military Reserve was formed at the outset of WWII. 
The ranks of the Coast Guard’s volunteers (renamed the Auxiliary) swelled during WWII 
and then dropped below 15,000 following the war. It was during the immediate post-war 
years that the Coast Guard identified and tasked the Auxiliary with the Recreational 
Boating Safety (RBS) mission. Supporting RBS remained the Auxiliary’s only 
legislatively assigned mission, until a regulatory change in 1996 permitted Auxiliarists to 
assist in almost all Coast Guard related activities. 
Figure 1 represents the force strength of all Coast Guard components 
between 1947 and 2011. The dark solid line represents the Auxiliary’s membership 
strength. Due to their proportionately larger size, the Auxiliary and Coast Guard Enlisted 
components are represented on the scale to the right. This was done to depict historic 
trends in all components, but to maximize the scale in order to clearly identify variation. 
The Auxiliary steadily grew from the mid 1950s to a high-water mark of 
just under 40,000 members in 1974. This coincides with the general growth of 
recreational boating in the U.S. After 1974, the variations in Auxiliary membership size 
depart from trends in U.S. recreational boating. Since then, the variation in membership 
size generally aligns with several Coast Guard policy shifts and major American events. 
While an in-depth discussion regarding why people historically joined or left the 
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Auxiliary is an interesting review of organizational culture, it falls outside the scope of 
this study. Of interest in this study are the activities of the members who do join, the 
outcomes of their effort, and the Coast Guard resources required to produce those 
outcomes. The important take-away from Figure 1 is that there are fluctuations in the size 
of all Coast Guard components; despite dips or adjustments in a component’s size from 
year to year, the organization has shown steady growth over the past 60 years. The 
recognizable exception is the Coast Guard’s Reserve component; the Reserve is less than 
half of the size it was in the 1960s—due to a change in federal regulations and Coast 
Guard funding limitations. There is no evidence to show that the overall membership in 
the Auxiliary is in decline; despite (or perhaps because of…) the increasing formality and 






















Figure 1.   Historic Auxiliary Membership—Represented Alongside All CG 
Components74 
Despite a measurable average membership net loss of about 100 
volunteers per year over the past 25 years, that loss amounts to less than 0.33% of the 
total—much better than a similar volunteer organization. Described in the literature 
review, the U.S. Power Squadrons (USPS) is the largest non-profit recreational boating 
safety organization in the United States. USPS and the Auxiliary perform almost identical 
volunteer services, to include vessel safety checks, boating safety classes, and safety 
patrols on the water. During the same 25-year period, USPS lost, on average, over eight 
times as many members per year than the Auxiliary. As represented in Figure 2, the 
membership roles of USPS have plummeted in the past 20 years, while Auxiliary 
membership has maintained relative stability—and is currently growing. Although 
                                                 
74 Michael A. Billeaudeaux, e-mail message to author, November 16, 2011. “CG Historic Strength 
(1947–Present).” Auxiliary historic membership statistics were added to the original figure by the author. 
The original figure did not include the Auxiliary. 
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dramatic changes in the economy and boating appear to have had negative affects on 
several volunteer boating oriented organizations, the impacts have been felt less by the 
Auxiliary. Unlike USPS, the Auxiliary is directly sponsored by a federal government 
agency (the Coast Guard) and also performs a wide range of duties beyond just 
recreational boating safety.  
 
 
Note: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with “x” 
represents the slope or the average total change in membership from year to year between FY 1984 and FY 
2011. On average, from 1984 to present, USPS has lost an average of over eight-times the number of 
members lost by the Auxiliary from year to year. 
Figure 2.   Historic Auxiliary Membership—Compared to U.S. Power Squadrons 
Membership75 
One naturally looks to the U.S. boating environment during this period of 
decline in USPS. Intuitively, the change in membership in a recreational boating safety 
                                                 
75 The referenced U.S. Power Squadrons annual membership numbers were provided by Mr. Frank A. 
Dvorak, the Chief Commander of the U.S. Power Squadrons at a conference in Chicago, IL on December 
13, 2011. 
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organization should simply reflect the overall state of boating in the U.S. Shown in 
Figure 3, the numbers of U.S. recreational vessel registrations steadily grew through the 
1980s and 1990s. It appears that the size of USPS grew, peaked, and then started to 
decline, relatively independent of the Nation’s overall recreational boating activity. 
Following a several year plateau, the decline in USPS membership continued through 
what may turn out to be another plateau today. Also, during the 1980–2001 period of 
increasing boating activity, the relative size of the Auxiliary remained relatively constant. 




Note: The displayed vessel registration statistics were taken directly from the U.S. Coast Guard’s 2011 
Boating Statistics Report and are re-represented in a new Figure similar the Figure presented in the report. 
Figure 3.   U.S. Recreational Vessel Registration 1980–201176 
                                                 
76 U.S. Coast Guard, Division of Boating Safety (CG-BSX-2), “2011 Boating Statistics Report–
Commandant Publication, 16754.25,” “Table 36: Recreational Vessels Registered by Year, 1980–2011,” 
65, (n.d.), http://www.uscgboating.org/. 
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So, why do people join boating safety oriented organizations? One theory 
is that some people, when taking on a new hobby or pastime, completely immerse 
themselves and “join everything.” Perhaps some individuals new to recreational boating 
join the Auxiliary out of excitement for a new boating hobby. 
Figure 4 is a graphic prepared by the National Marine Manufacturer’s 
Association (NMMA) and displays the trends in retail powerboat sales. Of note, the retail 
powerboat industry boomed throughout the 1980s, primarily driven by the introduction of 
personal watercraft and the marketing of other less expensive boating platforms. Both 
USPS and the Auxiliary grew in the 1980s and stopped growing at the about the same 
time the retail boating sales numbers peaked in 1990. Both organizations’ membership 
trends also similarly aligned with the following powerboat sales decline and several year 






Note: The above is a reprint of a National Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA) Figure. 
Figure 4.   U.S. Retail Power Boat Sales 1965–201077 
Following 9/11, the membership of USPS began a steady 10-year decline 
from a membership plateau. This decline began several years in advance of the recent 
2006 to 2010 decline in retail powerboat sales, which had remained somewhat stable for 
a few years following 9/11, until the overall dip in the U.S. economy caused a dramatic 
decline in boat sales. 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 had a far-reaching and history-
changing impact on Americans and the world. While the events directly impacted New 
York City, Washington, DC, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania, the strong sense of 
                                                 
77 National Marine Manufacturer’s Association (NMMA), “Recreational Boating Industry Trends” 
Power Point Presentation. Presented at the Boating Stakeholders Growth Summit, Chicago, IL, December 
11, 2011, Slide 2. 
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patriotism that swept the nation spurred many Americans to join the Auxiliary. As shown 
in Figure 5, membership in the Auxiliary surged throughout the nation.  
Prior to 9/11, there was no background-screening requirement for 
membership in the Auxiliary; someone with a criminal or otherwise unfavorable 
background could be a member. In 2003, the implementation of post-9/11 Homeland 
Security standards required that Auxiliarists, existing and prospective alike, must submit 
to a background check. This background check, called “Personnel Security Investigation” 
(PSI), amounted to a background screening comparable to those performed by most large 
companies during pre-employment screening.78 Regardless, many volunteers objected to 
this new procedure; approximately 6,000 Auxiliary members actively quit outright in 
2004, and another 3,000 were administratively disenrolled for non-compliance with the 
PSI requirement in 2006.79 Another factor having anecdotal support is the explanation 
that many Americans, swept by patriotic zeal, joined the Auxiliary; only after becoming 
members, did many realize that they had joined an organization whose primary purpose is 
to support recreational boating safety—and not direct conventional (armed) Homeland 
Security enforcement. Many people who joined the Auxiliary in 2002 and 2003 left the 
organization in 2004.80 Worth further note, as shown in Figure 5, once background 
checks were formalized and the remaining membership had passed and accepted the 
screening as a prerequisite, membership in the Auxiliary grew again.  
Interestingly, statistics regarding the numbers of fully qualified 
(participating) volunteers, and the number of volunteer-hours performed in the various 
Auxiliary activities, show a constant upward trend during this period. This will be studied 
in the next section. The dramatic loss of overall membership had no impact on the 
organization’s performance; while data isolating the specific performance of those who 
leave the Auxiliary is not available, it is reasonable to generalize those who left the 
organization during this period likely offered limited contributions. The implementation 
                                                 
78 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Manual, 3–13—3–21. 
79 Steven J. Minutolo (CG-BSX-1 Chief of Administration Branch), in discussion with the author, 
June 18, 2012. 
80 Ibid. 
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of the background check policy only temporarily stifled formal volunteerism in the 
Auxiliary—and it possibly indirectly raised the level of dedication of those who remained 
by removing people who could have been disreputable, disruptive, or otherwise 
distracting to the organization’s mission. 
 
 
Figure 5.   The Effects of 9/11 and Coast Guard Policy on Auxiliary Membership 
 Finding #1. Auxiliary membership numbers increase and decrease over 
time; Auxiliary membership is generally smaller than the past 40 years, 
but larger than the 30 years before that. National events and Coast Guard 
policies can be found to negatively impact membership over the short 
term. However, those negative impacts are temporary; volunteer interest 
remains and new members are regularly recruited. 
 Finding #2. Volunteer membership in the Auxiliary has been generally 
independent of the trends in national recreational boating registrations. 
Since 2007, Auxiliary membership has grown despite declines in boating 
and boat sales. 
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b. Auxiliarist Participation in the Operational Activities 
Functionally, since regulatory changes in 1996, and practically, since the 
formation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard’s new national 
status as a “Guardian,” many who join the Auxiliary join with no interest in participating 
in recreational boating safety. Rather, many wish to support other Coast Guard operations 
and programs. 
The total numbers of reported volunteer-hours contributed to each 
operational activity are represented in Figure 6. Interestingly, independent of the drop in 
membership from 2003 to 2007, five of the six programs reflected relatively consistent 
increasing volunteer participation. This prompts the rhetorical question, “How active 
were the individuals who left the Auxiliary?” 
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Note: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with 
“x” represents the slope, or the average total hourly change from year to year between FY 2003 and FY 
2011. The scale for each activity is different and should not be used for direct visual comparison. 
Figure 6.   FY 2003–FY 2011 Volunteer-Hours for the Primary Operational 
Activities81 
Similarly, shown in Figure 7, the number of individual missions reported 
by each Auxiliarist generally increased over the past eight years. Public Education was 
the only activity that reflected a consistent decrease in activity. On average (see trend 
line), Auxiliarists participate in about 900 fewer classes across America each year. Public 
Education is the one Auxiliary activity that is completely dependent on public 
enrollment; regardless of a volunteer’s level of interest, skill, and dedication, if the public 
does not enroll in a class, the class does not take place. Traditionally, there was only 
limited “competition” in boating safety public education; USPS was the only 
                                                 
81 AUXINFO, Online Database.  
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“competitor.” There has been a tremendous growth in the number of boating safety 
training alternatives to the American public in recent years. This is, in part, because of the 
implementation of a boating safety course completion requirement in some jurisdictions 
of the country, and because of the growth of internet-based training delivery alternatives. 
One pursuing boating safety education has quite a number of choices, with varying 
delivery methods, complexity levels, and cost. “Competition” is in quotes because it is a 
matter of opinion whether the decline in the Auxiliary’s traditional classroom Public 
Education program is indicative of a problem. One who simply wishes the boating public 
to receive safety awareness training, regardless of the source, would say that this may be 
indicative of success—that the training is now readily tapped from multiple sources. 
Others (often the Auxiliary perspective) may see this as a “loss of market share.” Note: 
classroom fees, in addition to covering actual material expenses for a given class, are the 
largest source of organizational income for the Auxiliary. The loss of revenue in recent 
years has limited the support these funds traditionally provided to various Auxiliary 
functions and events. 
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Note 1: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with 
“x” represents the slope, or the average change in number of missions from year to year between FY 2003 
and FY 2011. The scale for each activity is different and should not be used for direct visual comparison. 
 
Note 2: This Figure represents the number of missions per Auxiliarist; this is represented to indicate 
volunteer participation. In a following section, the number of missions per facility (boat or aircraft) is 
represented to calculate a government expense for each mission performed. A boat that gets underway with 
two Auxiliarists is represented as two in Figure 7 but is represented as one in Table 6. 
Figure 7.   FY 2003–FY 2011 Volunteer-Missions for the Primary Operational 
Activities 
Figure 8 is a combination of the data represented in the previous two 
Figures and represents the trend in the annual average duration of each mission an 
Auxiliarist performed. In five of the six activities, the average duration of each mission 
varied by just several minutes from year to year. Surprisingly, this figure identifies that 
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the average duration of each Auxiliary Aviation mission (per Auxiliarist) has dropped by 
approximately 30 minutes, per year, over the past eight years. Efforts to identify a cause 
for this were unsuccessful. There were no Coast Guard Policy changes implemented 
limiting mission duration, and a similar number and type of aircraft are being employed. 
Anecdotally, comments regarding the cost of fuel, and resulting limitations on mission 
length, are often heard by the full-time program managers. However, this does not make 
sense because the Coast Guard reimburses the actual fuel expenses incurred when 
Auxiliarists operate their facilities (boats and aircraft) under Coast Guard orders. The 
trends in the number of Auxiliary facilities will be addressed later. While the other 
Operational Auxiliary mission durations have remained constant, there has been an 
unexplained dramatic reduction in the duration of Auxiliary aviation missions. 
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Note: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with “x” 
represents the slope, or the average total hourly change from year to year between FY 2003 and FY 2011. 
The scale for each activity is the same and can be used for direct visual comparison. 
Figure 8.   FY 2003–FY 2011 Average Hours Per Mission (Per Auxiliarist) for the 
Primary Operational Activities 
In order to participate in the various operational activities, Auxiliarists 
must be “qualified” or pass a course of instruction, evaluation, apprenticeship, and then 
display a particular level of competency. In order to maintain that qualification, various 
continuing education, training, and performance standards must be met. Figure 9 
represents the annual total number of Auxiliarists qualified in each activity. There is no 
data available for the qualification of Auxiliarists who directly support Coast Guard 
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operational units because there are numerous job types, and qualification levels. 
Auxiliarist qualification in marine safety duties has only been formalized and tracked in 
recent years and offers no insight for this trend-review application.  
The number of qualified public education instructors has steadily declined, 
in concert with the overall decline in that program. The number of Auxiliarists qualified 
to operate boats and aircraft have generally declined at a rate comparable to the overall 
decline in the numbers of facilities. One can intuit that when (qualified) boat/aircraft 
owning Auxiliarists leave the organization, they take their facility with them. The 
peculiarity in this Figure is the large dip and restoration in the number of qualified vessel 
examiners; between 2003 and 2011, there was an almost 15% decline—and restoration—
in the numbers of qualified vessel examiners. No explanation for this, such as a policy 
change, was identified in the research. Perhaps existing qualified members quit the 
organization amid the background check exodus, and new Auxiliarists replaced them. 
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Note: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with “x” 
represents the slope, or the average total change in number qualified from year to year between FY 2003 
and FY 2011. The scale for each activity is different and should not be used for direct visual comparison. 
Figure 9.   Qualified Auxiliarists for Each Operational Activity, 2003–2011 
The range of review shown in Figure 9, a review of the most recent 
several years, is typical among the other studies of the Auxiliary mentioned in the 
literature review. This relatively short period of time does not provide the perspective 
necessary to give an overall picture of long-term trends. The same 2003–2011 data found 
in AUXINFO and displayed in Figure 9 was researched at the Auxiliary Historical 
Archives at East Carolina University with several data gaps filled by the assistance of 
Commodore Tom Mallison. Figure 10 shows the same data as Figure 9, but with a 
 54
significantly longer period of reference. Figure 10 reflects the long-term trends of the 
Auxiliary sub-programs. As discussed in the literature review, the previous studies of the 
Auxiliary were only concerned with recent three to five year trends versus decades-long 
trends. A longer time scale of review offers a much different perspective and provides 
opportunities to identify cause, effect, and duration of impacts to volunteer activity. 
Following a peak in the late 1970s there has been a relatively constant 
decline in the number of vessel examiners and public education instructors. Auxiliary-
specific qualification requirements to operate boats and aircraft originated in 1985, before 
then, anyone who complied with other regulatory requirements (FAA, etc.) could 
participate. The numbers of coxswains and boat crew have been in a steady decline since 
1996. There is no direct indication as to what started the decline. It may or may not be 
coincidence that 1996 was the year that the U.S. Code was modified to greatly expand the 
permitted duties of the Auxiliary. Perhaps the other Auxiliary activities are drawing 
participation away from the traditional activity of boat operation. The interesting anomaly 
in this Figure is the rapid surge and then decline in number of aircraft pilots and aircrew 
immediately following 9/11. No clear explanation was found for this in the course of this 
research. However, it does follow the general trend in aircraft being offered for use as 














Note: Individual data values compiled through reviewing numerous documents found in the Auxiliary 
Historical Archives at East Carolina University. Remaining missing data was identified with the assistance 
of Commodore Tom Mallison. The scale for each activity is different and should not be used for direct 
visual comparison. 




Note: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with “x” 
represents the slope, or the average total change in number of facilities from year to year between FY 2003 
and FY 2011. The scale for each facility type is different and should not be used for direct visual 
comparison. 
Figure 11.   Trends in Auxiliary Boats and Aircraft (Facilities) Accepted for Use, 2003–
2011 
Figure 11 represents the number of boat and aircraft facilities in use in the 
Auxiliary from 2003 to 2011. Note that the boat scale is on the left and the aircraft scale 
is on the right. This Figure represents a steady decline in both boat and aircraft facilities. 
On average, since 2003, the Auxiliary has on average about 279 fewer boats and about 13 
fewer aircraft per year. However, much like the qualification discussion, when looking at 
the longer view, a different trend emerges. Figure 12 represents the number of boat and 
aircraft facilities from 1963 to 2011. The number of boat facilities has been in relatively 
steady decline since the early 1970s.  
The number of aircraft facilities grew to a peak in 1991 and began to 
decrease through the 1990s. However, in the six years between 1997 and 2003, the 
number of aircraft tripled from 100 to 300. Then, the number sharply fell by a third to 
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approximately 200 by 2011. Two acronyms are likely explanations for this wild variation 
in the number of aircraft: “SAMA” and “TBO.” Aviation Standard Auxiliary 
Maintenance Allowance (SAMA) is a financial reimbursement made by the Coast Guard 
to an Auxiliary aircraft owner, designed to partially reimburse the owner for a portion of 
the prorated overall expense to maintain the aircraft’s engine, body, etc. The hourly rate 
is based on the size of the aircraft engine, and is generally well over $100 per hour. 
Historically, volunteers were only given reimbursements for fuel, not boat or aircraft 
maintenance. SAMA rates and reimbursement turn-around is a hot-button issue among 
Auxiliary aviators. Aviation SAMA issue complaints are the largest single source of U.S. 
Congressional inquiries (inquiring on behalf of their constituent) to the Coast Guard’s 
Auxiliary program.82 Not coincidentally, aviation SAMA was instituted in 1998, and the 
Auxiliary was “flooded” with aircraft and owners eager to fly them under this new 
reimbursement plan.83  
Time Between Overhaul (TBO) is an aircraft maintenance requirement. 
Aircraft engine manufacturers identify a standard number of hours an engine should be 
operated before an overhaul is “recommended.” This is an expensive maintenance event 
that some owners resist. This is akin to an automobile owner taking an automobile in for 
“recommended” maintenance based on mileage—often when the vehicle seems to be 
operating perfectly well—simply because an owner’s manual cites a particular 
“recommended” action.  Aircraft maintenance is much more expensive than automobile 
maintenance. But, when automobile engines fail, the vehicle coasts to a stop; when 
aircraft engines fail… In 2006, following a tragic and fatal Auxiliary aircraft crash, the 
Coast Guard instituted policy stating that in order to be accepted by the Coast Guard for 
use in the Auxiliary, all aircraft must be overhauled in accordance with the 
manufacturer’s TBO “recommendation.” This initiated a flurry Congressional Inquiries 
and various other efforts by some Auxiliarist aircraft owners seeking to circumvent this 
                                                 
82 Steven J. Minutolo (CG-BSX-1 Chief of Administration Branch), in discussion with the author, 
June 18, 2012. 
83 Michael D. Barner, Internal Coast Guard Headquarters White Paper to Coast Guard Deputy 
Commandant for Operations, “SAMA Background and Impacts of Denial,” March 28, 2011, references 
COMDTNOTE 16798, October 16, 1998. 
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newly imposed safety measure. The prorated hourly aviation SAMA calculation, which 
originated in 1997, factors in the estimated TBO-compliance overhaul expense. SAMA 
was paid to the aircraft owners, without the Coast Guard actually verifying that the 
payments were used to maintain the aircraft, until 2006. It is reasonable to postulate that 
over 100 aircraft owners joined the Auxiliary in order to collect SAMA payments, and 
then left the Auxiliary when required to spend those funds on maintaining their aircraft. 
In 2006, the Coast Guard initiated prorated SAMA reimbursements to the 
owners of Auxiliary boat facilities, based on the boat and engine size, similar to aviation. 
Estimates from industry show that while aviation SAMA supports roughly 75% of actual 
aircraft maintenance expenses, surface SAMA only supports roughly 35% of actual boat 
maintenance expenses.84 Unlike aviation SAMA, the initiation of surface SAMA appears 






                                                 
84 Barner, Internal Coast Guard Headquarters White Paper to Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for 
Operations, “SAMA Background and Impacts of Denial.” 
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Note: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with “x” 
represents the slope, or the average total change in number of facilities from year to year. The scale for 
each facility type is different and should not be used for direct visual comparison. 
Figure 12.   Historic Trends in Auxiliary Boats and Aircraft (Facilities) Accepted for 
Use, 1963–2011 
Figure 12 presents the historic numbers of boats and aircraft used in the 
Auxiliary. When an overall trend line is applied to the 1963 to 2011 figures for numbers 
of boats and aircraft, the 50-year trend in boat numbers aligns closely with that of the past 
eight years. The aircraft trend line actually indicates an average increase of three aircraft 
per year from 1963 to 2011. Figure 13 represents the year-to-year representation of 
aircraft in the overall Auxiliary fleet of operational facilities (boats and aircraft). Aircraft 
represent a steadily growing portion of all facilities, with the rate or slope of that growth 
dramatically increased since the late 1990s. 
In addition to the overall decrease in the number of boats, the 
representation of boats has decreased; stated differently, the ratio of Auxiliarists per boat 
has grown almost five fold. Referring to membership data represented in Figure 1 and 
 60
boat facility data represented in Figure 12, there were 37,281 Auxiliarists with 16,814 
boats in 1973, and 30,257 Auxiliarists with 3,094 boats in 2011; that equates to a shift 
from 2.2 Auxiliarists per boat in 1973 to 9.8 Auxiliarists per boat in 2011. With an 
average flotilla size of approximately 30 members, the basic Auxiliary membership unit 
has shifted from having about 14 boats down to three boats. This loss in boats has 
dramatically affected the depth and variety of waterborne platforms and limits the access 
of non-boat owning volunteers who seek to participate on the water. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Relative Representation of Aviation Auxiliary Facilities, 1963–2011 
 Finding #3. The average duration of Auxiliary Aviation missions is in 
decline while the duration of all other missions is relatively constant.  
 Finding #4. The number of operational hours served and missions 
performed in Surface and Air Operations Support is increasing despite a 
general decline in the number qualified participants. Fewer qualified 
volunteers are reporting more hours and missions. 
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 Finding #5. The relatively constant 50-year declining trend in the number 
of surface facilities (boats) is independent of national retail powerboat 
sales and Coast Guard financial support (SAMA). 
 Finding #6. The offering of aircraft for use as Auxiliary facilities is largely 
dependent on the degree of Coast Guard financial subsidization (SAMA) 
and maintenance requirements (TBO). 
 Finding #7. There has been a three-fold increase in the presence of aircraft 
as a percentage of all operational facilities since the institution of aviation 
SAMA in 1997. 
B. AUXILIARY DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. The Present 
The demographic make-up of the Auxiliary is not a factor that has been tracked 
and recorded over the years. Therefore, this study cannot present what the demographic 
makeup of the Auxiliary was at any past point, and cannot identify if there were any 
changes in the overall demographic over time. This section reviews the present Auxiliary 
make-up and the racial/ethnic trend of the overall U.S. population. For clarity, the 
racial/ethnic demographic information is presented as it is currently recorded in the 
AUXDATA system; this delineation does not match conventional U.S. government 
standards and is in need of adjustment as discussed below. According to Hispanic 
Research, Inc., the U.S. Government in 1977 established that American Indian, Alaskan 
Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, and White are racial classifications. Ethnic 
classifications include Hispanic origin and Not Hispanic origin.85 One has both a race 
and an ethnicity.  Despite its conventional inaccuracy, this data is a depiction of the 
Auxiliary membership demographic and is useful. 
In the course of conducting research at East Carolina University, one report in the 
1970s and another in the 1980s identified the number of women in the Auxiliary, but did 
not provide enough information to be of use in discussing organizational trends. The 
reports did, however, indicate that the Coast Guard at that time was making an effort to 
                                                 




increase the representation of women in the Auxiliary. Presently, women comprise 22.3% 
of Auxiliary membership. More than half have of all women in the Auxiliary share a 
home address with another Auxiliarist; it is assumed that in the majority of cases, this 
cohabitant is a spouse.86 While some women may join the Auxiliary along with a spouse, 
there is no participation gap between men and women; women are active participants 
involved in every activity and their representation in regional and National leadership 
positions is comparable to their overall membership. 
Members of the Auxiliary self-report their date of birth, their gender, and their 
(single) affiliated race/ethnicity. That data is entered into the member’s AUXDATA 
profile. When demographic reports are run in AUXINFO, the information returned 
represents the active membership; there is no way to run a historical demographic 
report—a report of past members is not currently possible, and past demographic reports 
are not maintained. With that clarified, a “snapshot” of the demographic profile of the 
Auxiliary was recorded on December 17, 2011 and is represented in Figures 14 and 15. 
Unfortunately, 16.5% of Auxiliary membership did not self-select and report their 
race/ethnicity in AUXDATA; the presented information represents the 83.5% of 
Auxiliary membership who did self-select and report their race/ethnicity. 
The AUXINFO demographic categories include five categories: “White,” 
“Black,” “Hispanic,” “Asian,” and “Native American.” While limiting in its depiction of 
race/ethnicity—there are only five categories and there is no allowance to choose 
multiple race/ethnicities—this is the available data, and is represented herein as an 
indicator of the degree of Auxiliary membership diversity. Ideally, the AUXDATA 
database should be modified to match contemporary racial and ethnic definitions, and 
permit the selection of multiple depictions. This exemplar is indicative of limited 
resourcing for computer programming support and is not representative of Coast Guard 
oversight or bias.87 If the recommendations of this study (discussed in Chapter V) are 
carried out, this and other database programming issues should be resolved. 
                                                 
86 AUXDATA, Online Database.  
87 Minutolo, in discussion with the author, June 18, 2012.  
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The demographic reports include the numbers of Auxiliarists in the represented 
age-bands, and their sex and race/ethnicity (“none reported” is a sixth category that is not 
displayed). Figure 14 shows each of the 10 groups as a different colored line and the age-
band groupings from left to right. The top-most line represents the “Male (White)” 
members, followed by “Female (White)” members well below. All of the other groups 
have small enough numbers that they are indiscernible at the bottom of Figure 14. 
 
 
Note: Auxiliary member demographic information is self-identified and self-reported in AUXDATA. At 
the time of this data-gather, 16.5% of Auxiliarists chose to not self-associate with one of the five 
race/ethnicity options listed in the AUXDATA database; they are not represented. This chart represents the 
83.5% of Auxiliary membership who chose to self-identify and self-report. 
Figure 14.   “Snapshot” of Auxiliary Demographics—December 201188 
In order to display the representation of the other eight groups to a level that 
facilitates discussion, the same data that is represented in Figure 14 is represented 
identically in Figure 15, only the member scale incrementation on the left is reduced from  
 
 
                                                 
88 AUXINFO Online Database, “Member Report,” December 17, 2011. 
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1,000 people to 50 people. In essence, Figure 15 is “Zoomed-in” to show minority 
representation in the Auxiliary. The top full-length line in Figure 15 represents “Male 
(Hispanic).”  
Please note between the two Figures: “Male (White)” representation in the 
Auxiliary is greatest in the 60–69 age band while “Male (Hispanic)” peaks in the 40–49 
age band. The largest group of White men, approximately 5,400, are in their 60s, while 
the largest group of Hispanic men, approximately 275, are in their 40s—a generation 
their junior. This will be discussed next. 
 
 
Note: The above represents the same data as Figure 14, but is “zoomed-in” to make minority representation 
discernable. 
Figure 15.   “Snapshot” of Auxiliary Demographics—December 2011 (Zoomed-In) 
 Finding #8. The membership of the Auxiliary is primarily older and 
White. 
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2. The Future? 
The population of the U.S. is ever growing. Different ethnic and racial groups 
have varying growth rates, based on factors to include culture, education, health care 
access, mortality, and emigration. Researchers at Rice University conducted a study of 
U.S. population growth rates and projected population growth within several primary 
groups, shown in Figure 16.  
 
 
Note: The above is a reprint of a slide created by Steve H. Murdock, and Allyn and Gladys 
Cline. 
Figure 16.   Projected 2000–2050 U.S. Population Increase (Numerical), by Race and 
Hispanic Origin.89 
Between 2000 and 2050, the Hispanic population in the U.S. is projected to grow 
several orders of magnitude faster than the other main ethnicities. The majority of the 
increase in the U.S. population will be within the Hispanic community. Figure 17 
                                                 
89 Steve H. Murdock, “Population Growth and Diversification in Rural and Urban America: 
Implications for Health, Education, The Labor Force And Economic Development,” PowerPoint 
Presentation, Presented to Recreational Boating Stakeholders Growth Summit, Chicago, IL, December 14, 
2011, Slide 55/90. 
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represents the same population growth information as Figure 16; only Figure 17 shows 
the overall percentage that each group is projected to contribute to the overall population 




Note: The above is a reprint of a slide created by Steve H. Murdock. 
Figure 17.   Projected 2000–2050 U.S. Population Increase (Percentage), by Race and 
Hispanic Origin.90 
Figures 16 and 17 represent population growth by race/ethnicity, the next Figure 
represents overall total population representation by race/ethnicity. As depicted in Figure 
18, Whites represented approximately 85% of the American population in 1960. It is 
projected that Non-Hispanic Whites will represent less than half of the population by 
2050, with Hispanics rapidly becoming the largest minority. 
As previously presented, the median age of Hispanics in the Auxiliary is 
approximately a generation younger than Non-Hispanic Whites. This could be indicative 
                                                 
90 Murdock, “Population Growth and Diversification in Rural And Urban America: Implications For 
Health, Education, The Labor Force And Economic Development,” Slide 56/90. 
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of growing prosperity in this group—prosperity that grows from generation to generation. 
The Coast Guard and the Auxiliary would do well to research and understand the cultural 
nuances of the American Hispanic community, because it is projected to become a major 
element of the future demographic of the Nation—America’s future volunteers. 
 
 
Note: The above is a reprint of a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Figure. 




                                                 
91 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging 
Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty,” Report, 7, Figure 2, January 2012, 
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=4995. 
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 Finding #9. The American White population representation is decreasing 
while the three largest American non-White minorities are growing. The 
American Hispanic population representation, which is already the largest 
minority represented in the Auxiliary, is growing rapidly. 
C. COAST GUARD RESOURCING OF THE AUXILIARY PROGRAM 
The term “resourcing” is common in Coast Guard program management parlance 
and includes both funds (dollars) spent by the Coast Guard in direct support of a program 
as well as the level of effort required by the full-time employed (FTE) program managers 
and workers. Since the Coast Guard pays the salaries of the FTE, their level of effort 
(time) expended in support of a task or sub-program can be studied and equated to 
organizational dollars spent. Including the salaries of FTE, the Coast Guard presently 
devotes approximately $17.4M toward the Auxiliary program (approximately $9.5M in 
direct program funding and approximately $8M in the form of FTE salaries for 74 
people). The resources devoted to the studied programs only comprise a portion—
roughly half—of that funding, with some devoted to other programs and much devoted to 
general Auxiliary programmatic administrative overhead. All of the Auxiliary program’s 
direct “resourcing” has been studied herein. Some assumptions were made and are 
articulated in Chapter III and in Appendix A. Those assumptions generally result in a 
slight over-estimation of “General Auxiliary Membership Admin” expenses. The 
assumptions have minimal affect on the relative expense of the programs to each other 
and therefore adequately support the goal of this study. 
The resourcing of the Auxiliary during the most recent year, fiscal year 2011, was 
studied in detail. The trend of budgetary fiscal year funding (dollars) is also presented to 
offer some perspective regarding recent funding trends. This funding data was only 
available because Mr. Steve Minutolo, the Auxiliary program office (CG-BSX-1) 
Administration Branch Chief at Coast Guard Headquarters, personally maintained these 
records during his tenure in his position. The Coast Guard does not otherwise retain these 
records to the level necessary for this study. Unfortunately, there is no history regarding 
the Auxiliary program FTE. For clarification, the acronym “DIRAUX” as depicted in this 
resourcing discussion refers to the full time Coast Guard employees who work in the 14 
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regional Director of Auxiliary offices throughout the country. These FTE directly manage 
the regional Auxiliary operations, and therefore have direct involvement in the studied 
sub-programs. Historical records of these FTE staffing levels are not available and are not 
discussed. 
1. FY 2011 Resourcing  
a. FY 2011 Direct Funding 
The FY 2011 direct funding of the Auxiliary program is depicted in Table 
2. The major funding elements are organized across the top, with the total element 
amount immediately below, and the corresponding expenditure within each sub-program 
listed further below. The seven people working within the Auxiliary program 
management office at Coast Guard Headquarters (CG-BSX-1) are included as funding 
elements versus program management staffing because they are treated differently than 
the personnel in the field. Headquarters personnel are not considered to be critical to the 
organization and direction of the Auxiliary by Coast Guard leadership; CG-BSX-1 
positions are regularly left vacant, assigned to individuals junior to the position 
descriptions, and the staff has been systematically reduced over recent years, much like 
funding elements. The Coast Guard has numerous funding accounts. The funding types in 
Table 2 all have different funding accounts and most have different funding managers, 








Note 1: As described in Chapter III, accounting of DIRAUX Office funding of Operational Programs was 
not included due to the complexity of gathering the data. The funds are assumed to be 100% attributed to 
general Auxiliary membership Administration. 
 
Note 2: The funding and personnel costs of the Auxiliary Program Office at Coast Guard Headquarters 
(CG-5421, recently renamed CG-BSX-1) is assumed to be programmatic overhead 100% attributed to 
general Auxiliary membership Administration. 
 
Note 3: The Coast Guard is unable to identify how much of the Patrol Expenses (Fuel) is attributed to each 
program. Until FY 2011, Aviation SAMA was reimbursed from the Coast Guard Fuel account at the annual 
rate of approximately $1M. The Patrol Expenses (Fuel) breakdown above is an empirical estimate. 
Table 2.   FY 2011 Direct CG Funding of Auxiliary Operational Programs 
b. FY 2011 Auxiliary Program Management Staffing 
Table 3 depicts the office and military rank or government civilian pay 
grade in which each of the 74 FTE worked during FY 2011. For example, D1NR (Coast 
Guard District One, Northern Region) is comprised of four people, an O5 Diraux (senior 
person), a CWO OTO (Chief Warrant Officer—Operational Training Officer), a GS-7 
civilian employee, and a YN2 (Second Class Yeoman). 
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Table 3.   FY 2011 Auxiliary Program Management Staff 
The Coast Guard Headquarters Auxiliary program management office 
performed a work-study that was used for this analysis. Each of the 14 regional Director 
of Auxiliary offices was asked to identify the percentage of each employee’s work time 
devoted to each of eight categories; these included the six studied operational sub-
programs, general Auxiliary membership administration, and all other tasks. The 
employee responses were organized into three groups: Directors of Auxiliary (DIRAUX) 
- the senior person in each office; the Operational Training Officers (OTO) within each 
office; and the rest of the staffs. All government employees have a specific cost to the 
Coast Guard attributed to them. This is referred to as a “standard personnel cost.” The 
overall standard personnel cost for each of the 67 regional DIRAUX office personnel was 
identified (Reminder: the seven personnel at Coast Guard Headquarters are considered 
overhead), and the corresponding “cost” of their time (to the Coast Guard), based on the 
percentage attributed to each category, was calculated and summarized in Table 4. 
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General Duties DIRAUX Cost to CG OTO Cost to CG Staff Cost to CG Total Cost to CG
Overall Personnel / Salary Cost 14 people $2,284,596 16 people $1,879,26838 people $2,986,767 $7,150,631
Aux Membership Admin 47.5% $1,082,676 27.4% $521,053 81.2% $2,427,071 $4,030,799
Surface Operations (boat‐related) 14.4% $329,000 42.9% $802,943 5.8% $171,489 $1,303,432
Air Operations (aircraft‐related) 8.8% $200,176 6.8% $143,328 3.6% $108,685 $452,189
Vessel Safety Check Program 0.9% $21,153 3.4% $57,914 0.1% $2,329 $81,396
Public Education 2.4% $54,373 1.9% $29,788 0.1% $2,329 $86,491
Marine Safety 1.8% $40,684 4.2% $65,262 0.2% $6,132 $112,078
CG Unit Support (non‐MSO) 8.4% $191,879 5.9% $111,669 1.0% $29,282 $332,829




Table 4.   Salary Expense of Time Expended Managing Auxiliary Programs by Coast 
Guard Full-Time Employees92 
c. Overall FY 2011 Auxiliary Operational Sub-program Resourcing  
Figure 19 displays in pie-chart format the corresponding portion of total 
resourcing (funding plus staffing, Table 2 plus Table 4) devoted to each operational 
program in fiscal year 2011. 
 
                                                 
92 Result of a survey completed by each of the 14 Directors of Auxiliary and forwarded to the 
Auxiliary Program Manager, Commander Michael D. Barner. The surveys were completed February 2–9, 
2012. The results were compiled into “Assessment of Regional Directors of Auxiliary Workload” Excel 
spreadsheet on February 11, 2012. 
 73
 
Note: The above resourcing breakdown reflects all direct Auxiliary program resourcing during FY 2011—
both programmatic funding and the cost equivalence of full-time Coast Guard staff tasked with managing 
the Auxiliary program. 
Figure 19.   2011 Direct Coast Guard Expenditures within the Auxiliary Program  
 Finding #10. Auxiliary membership administration, the overhead expense 
for managing the organization, consumes approximately half of the direct 
resourcing of the Auxiliary program. 
2. Auxiliary Program Historic Funding 
Auxiliary program funding data for fiscal years 2001 to 2011 were preserved 
locally by CG-BSX-1, and is presented in Table 5. At the bottom of Table 5, the direct 




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Auxiliary District 
Budget Model 1,231,276$   1,469,322$   2,869,661$     2,847,702$     2,729,008$     2,758,801$     2,758,801$     2,595,122$   2,581,789$   2,734,611$   2,762,234$  
CGHQ Program 
Office (CG‐5421) 1,243,830$   1,177,924$   2,459,633$     2,240,207$     1,700,970$     1,042,883$     1,077,382$     1,077,382$   1,077,382$   1,077,382$   1,077,382$  
PPE (from CG‐741)1 1,742,366$    876,312$       1,077,756$    1,100,942$    1,029,828$  1,037,947$  1,093,812$   1,223,297$ 
Fuel (CG‐8)2 2,900,000$   2,900,000$  2,900,000$     2,900,000$    2,900,000$    2,900,000$    2,900,000$    2,900,000$  2,900,000$  2,900,000$   2,900,000$ 
SAMA (Surface) 500,000$       500,000$       500,000$     500,000$      500,000$      500,000$    
Claims (CG‐0945)2 100,000$      100,000$      100,000$        100,000$       100,000$       100,000$       100,000$       100,000$     100,000$      100,000$      100,000$    
C‐Schools (AFC‐56)2 1,000,000$   1,000,000$  1,000,000$     1,000,000$    1,000,000$    1,000,000$    1,000,000$    1,000,000$  1,000,000$  1,000,000$   1,000,000$ 
 Unadjusted Total   $  6,475,106   $  6,647,246   $    9,329,294  $  10,830,275  $    9,306,290  $    9,379,440  $    9,437,125  $  9,202,332  $  9,197,118   $  9,405,805   $  9,562,913 
Inflation Adjustment 
to 2011 Dollars 27.1% 25.0% 22.2% 19.1% 15.2% 11.6% 8.5% 4.5% 4.8% 3.2%
Total Adjusted to 
2011 dollars 8,229,860$   8,309,058$   11,400,397$   12,898,858$   10,720,846$   10,467,455$   10,239,281$   9,616,437$   9,638,580$   9,706,791$   9,562,913$    
Note 1: Funding specifically allocated for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was not provided prior to 
FY 2004. 
 
Note 2: Historic data on three expenditure elements was not available. Those elements were assumed to be 
constant 2001–2011, using the budgeted FY 2012 amounts:  
a) Fuel reimbursements ($2.9M budgeted in 2012) 
b) Damage claims ($100K budgeted in 2012) 
c) “C-school” training allocations ($1.0M budgeted in 2012) 
Table 5.   Direct Coast Guard Funding of Auxiliary Program (Does Not Include 
Regional Management Personnel Costs)93,94 
The Auxiliary program received a considerable increase of just over $2.5M in FY 
2003, essentially doubling the programmatic funding of the regional Director of 
Auxiliary offices and the headquarters program management operations. The regional 
funding increase was sustained while the headquarters funding was then dropped below 
the 2001 funding level in following years. Additionally, the Coast Guard began funding 
the purchase and issuance of personal protective equipment (PPE) for Auxiliarists in 
2003. With this PPE funding, the Auxiliary program purchases life jackets, dry suits, 
Personal Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (PPIRBS), and other safety-
related equipment for Auxiliarists who perform in waterborne and airborne operations. 
Figure 20 represents the same data presented in Table 5. Note that the trend line, 
which indicates the average annual change in funding, shows the inflation-normalized 
program funding to be essentially static over the past 10 years. 
 
                                                 
93 Mark A. Unpingco, e-mail message to author, “Aux Program Funding History,” January 13, 2012. 
94 U.S. Inflation Calculator, (n.d.), http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/. 
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Note: The associated trend lines are a linear representation of the “curve.” The number associated with “x” 
represents the slope, or the average programmatic funding change from year to year between FY 2001 and 
FY 2011. 
Figure 20.   2001–2011 Direct Coast Guard Funding of Auxiliary Program (Table 5 
Data) 
Similar to the data search for historical records regarding Auxiliary membership, 
activity, and funding, the records regarding the programmatic staffing by full-time Coast 
Guard employees was attempted, but is unavailable. Additionally, at the time of this 
writing (spring 2012), the Coast Guard is seeking to identify full-time positions, both 
military and civilian, to eliminate; the data presented herein could possibly be used to 
identify positions to eliminate—the opposite of the goal of this study. The Auxiliary 
program office forwarded a white paper to Coast Guard Leadership in spring 2011.95 In 
that paper, the workload of each of the 14 regional offices was measured and compared to  
 
                                                 
95 Michael D. Barner, Internal Coast Guard Headquarters White Paper, “USCG Regional Director of 
Auxiliary Office Staffing Study,” March 2, 2011. 
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one another. The Auxiliary program office was seeking permission to reallocate resources 
within the Auxiliary program from several regional offices to others with 
disproportionately heavy workloads. 
No regional historic data regarding staffing is available. Of the 74 full-time Coast 
Guard employees who manage the Auxiliary program, seven are assigned to Coast Guard 
Headquarters and 67 work at 14 regional offices. Conversations with long-served 
Auxiliarists indicate that virtually all regional Director of Auxiliary staffs were 
significantly larger prior to several rounds of Coast Guard personnel cuts starting in the 
mid-1990s. Anecdotally, it is reported that the program management staffing for the 
Auxiliary program used to be twice the level it is today, but that cannot be confirmed. A 
recent example can be provided with certainty; the Coast Guard Headquarters Auxiliary 
Program Management staff (CG-BSX-1) previously included an additional Coast Guard 
Commander and Coast Guard Lieutenant. The Lieutenant position was ordered 
eliminated in 2006, and the Commander position was ordered eliminated in 2012.96 The 
Coast Guard Headquarters staff is now about 25% smaller than it was just six years ago. 
The Coast Guard grew significantly after the attacks of September 11, 2001.97 
However, of the 3,250 military and civilian positions added between 2001 and 2003 (an 
organizational expansion of almost 10%), exactly zero of them were added to the 
Auxiliary program management staff, despite a considerable expansion of the Auxiliary 
membership during that period.98 Now, as the Coast Guard is seeking to shrink the size of 
its civilian and military force, to match reduced federal budgets, some Auxiliary program 
management positions are being identified for possible elimination. 
 
 
                                                 
96 First-hand observations of the Coast Guard Auxiliary Program manager, Commander Michael 
Barner. 
97 See Figure 1. 
98 Steven J. Minutolo (CG-BSX-1 Chief of Administration Branch), in discussion with the author, 
April 20, 2012. 
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While historic full-time Auxiliary program management staffing is not available, 
and therefore cannot be used to present Coast Guard resourcing trends, it is evident (but 
unsupportable) that Auxiliary program management personnel resources are significantly 
less than 30 years ago.  
 Finding #11. The direct funding of the Auxiliary program, when adjusted 
for inflation, has progressively decreased since an infusion immediately 
following 9/11. 
D.  SUMMARY OF FY 2011 AUXILIARY PROGRAM RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT 
This may be viewed as the “bottom-line” or ultimate point of this study. Table 6 
compiles all of the data related to Auxiliarist participation and Coast Guard resource 
expenditures in FY 2011, relative to the six operational activities being studied. This 
Table could be independently used as the primary take-away of this effort. It represents 
the number of Auxiliarists who recorded activity in each sub-program and the overall 
number of hours they provided this service (the overall relative percentage of 
membership/activity is in parentheses). The table presents the relative Coast Guard 
resourcing devoted to each activity, in direct funding and full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employee value. Next, the table includes the measurable outcomes specific to each 
activity. In addition to reporting the time spent performing a task, the AUXDATA 
program allows the documentation of any lives or property directly saved. While 
members of the Auxiliary occasionally directly save lives and property, a common 
assessment of the result of their work is to correlate the volunteer effort to an equivalent 
number of Coast Guard members/employees it would require to perform the same task. 
The Marine Safety and Coast Guard Unit Support sub-programs have no distinct or 
specific outcome but they perform duties parallel and in collaboration with Coast Guard 
units. Therefore, outcome measurement of these two sub-programs uses the empirical and 
general estimation that every 2,000 volunteer-hours logged is equivalent to one Coast 
Guard full-time employee. 
To the right side of the table, Auxiliarist participation, Coast Guard resource 
expenditures, and measurable outcomes, are used to calculate two very different—and 
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unrelated—return on investment (ROI) calculations—each activity’s volunteer 
participation relative to the Coast Guard resources expended, and the actual mission 
outcomes resulting from that same resource expenditure.  
“Mission Outcome Return on Investment” represents the resources expended by 
the Coast Guard directly on each sub-program to deliver a per-outcome return. To use the 
first example in Table 6, each Vessel Safety Check (VSC) performed by the Auxiliary 
costs the Coast Guard $0.63. This return on investment is irrespective of the number of 
people involved, their effort, and the number of volunteer-hours that may have been 
dedicated to that activity.  
Conversely, “Volunteer Involvement Return on Investment” represents the more 
commonly used standard of volunteer effort, “volunteer-time value” per organizational 
dollar expended. Continuing with the first example in Table 6, for every $1.00 spent by 
the Coast Guard to support the Vessel Examination sub-program, the volunteers provide 
$24.60 in Vessel Examination effort. This return on investment is irrespective of 
outcomes and assigns a “value” merely to volunteer participation in an activity.  
The “value” of volunteer involvement or effort is often correlated to an equivalent 
cost to have a paid employee perform similar duties throughout a similar duration. While 
some volunteer activities require the employment of unskilled and lesser-paid labor, other 
volunteer activities require advanced skills and credentials; some volunteers provide 
phone call reminders and stuff envelopes, while others provide tax preparation or legal 
advice. Independent Sector is a national organization that specializes in studying 
volunteerism. Independent Sector’s current and nationally accepted estimate of the value 
of a volunteer-hour in the U.S. is $21.36. It is a generalized national hourly volunteer 
“value” (not necessarily cost-avoidance) and can be attributed to the volunteer effort (not 
results) in an activity.99 In the absence of other information, this would be the appropriate 
rate to use in calculating a “value” for Auxiliarist participation and effort. However, the 
Coast Guard has determined, for the purposes of benefits under the Federal Employee’s 
                                                 
99 Independent Sector, “Independent Sector Announces New Estimate for Value of Volunteer Time,” 
March 17, 2011, http://www.independentsector.org/is_announces_value_of_volunteer_time_031711. This 
represents the 2010 value. This is the most recent value available at the time of this writing. 
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Compensation Act, that Auxiliarist “…compensation is based upon a percentage of the 
base pay for grade GS-9 (Step 1) [federal employee] of the General Schedule in effect on 
the date…” of an event subject to compensation from the Government.100 The 2011 
hourly base pay equivalent for a GS-9 (Step 1) government employee was $19.92.101 
Because this analysis is intended for a Coast Guard audience and organizational 
consideration within the Coast Guard, the GS-9 (Step 1) rate of $19.92 per hour is used 
versus the otherwise nationally accepted rate of $21.36. 
The collected data is presented in a matrix format to facilitate analysis and 
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(1.1%)  $   1,043,449   $ 1,766,000   $    452,189   $ 2,218,189 
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-The green blocks represent quantitative data gathered from the AUXINFO database. 
-The blue blocks represent Coast Guard Expenditures obtained from CG-BSX-1. 
 
Note 1: The Missions reported in this table represent facility-missions, not member-missions, as reported in 
Figure 7. A boat that performs a mission with two Auxiliarists on board is represented as one mission in 
Table 6, whereas it reflects two member-missions in Figure 7. 
Table 6.   Primary Operational Activities—Return on Investment 
The return on investment information calculated in Table 6 directly answers one 
of the three research sub questions, “What Return on Investment do the Auxiliary sub-
programs offer the Coast Guard?” The programmatic ROIs also assist in answering the 
                                                 
100 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Manual, 5–62. 
101 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Salaries and Wages, Salary Table 2011-GS,” (n.d.), 
http://www.opm.gov/oca/11tables/html/gs_h.asp. 
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other two research sub questions regarding in which areas the Coast Guard could best 
leverage the Auxiliary, and where to adjust existing programmatic resources to maximize 
the Auxiliary’s effectiveness. 
 Finding #12. Auxiliary operational activities—with the exception of Air 
Operations Support—offer significant measured outcomes at minimal per 
unit expense to the Coast Guard, and have a positive volunteer 
involvement return on investment.  
 Finding #13. Air Operations Support has limited measured outcomes and a 
negative volunteer involvement return on investment, yet consumes 12.7% 
of Auxiliary programmatic resourcing. 
1. Overall Auxiliary Program Return on Investment 
One could attempt to assess the entire Auxiliary program’s return on investment 
in terms of mission outcome and volunteer involvement, but that would require several 
overarching key and potentially misleading assumptions, and is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, in the spirit of a complete review, the same two return on investment 
calculations, as applied to individual sub-programs, could be applied to the overall 
Auxiliary program, and are discussed below. 
The Auxiliary’s operationally supporting activities have diverse outcomes. The 
most expedient method to consider the combined outcome of the entire program is to first 
assume that all Auxiliary operational activities are necessary, and if not performed by an 
Auxiliarist they would necessarily be performed by a Coast Guard military or civilian 
employee to the same degree; in reality, this is not the case. Secondly, one would have to 
assume that the Coast Guard military or civilian employee who would perform this task 
would match the duration and pace of activity performed by Auxiliarists. Thirdly, 
Auxiliarists serve part-time as they are able; the same assumption as made for studying 
two of the sub-programs would have to be made to correlate Auxiliarist activity to an 
equivalent Coast Guard full time equivalent employee (FTE). For this effort, the author 
chose a correlation of 2,000 Auxiliarist volunteer-hours equate to one FTE. Using this 
logic and following these assumptions, the 1,222,047 operationally focused volunteer 
hours reported in Table 1 equate to 611 FTE. Using the overall Coast Guard Auxiliary 
program funding of $17.4M, the Auxiliary program delivers an overall outcome 
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return on investment to the Coast Guard at a cost of $28,477 per FTE. That cost per 
FTE is significantly greater than the costs specifically calculated for the Marine Safety 
and CG Unit Support sub-programs because the costs represented in Table 6 only 
consider the resourcing specifically directed to those activities; the 53.1% of the 
Auxiliary programmatic funding attributed to Auxiliary membership Administration 
(programmatic overhead), shown in Figure 19, was not included in the assessment of the 
sub-programs because the intent is to compare the sub-programs to one another. 
Previous studies presented the overall cost of the Auxiliary Program ($17.4M in 
FY 2011) and the total number of Auxiliarist volunteer-hours (4,861,156 reported in 
Table 1) to calculate a general Auxiliary ROI, using a per-hour volunteer “value.” Using 
the discussed GS-9 (Step-1) rate, the FY 2011 Volunteer involvement return on 
investment is $5.58 in “value” for every $1.00 spent by the Coast Guard. That value 
has no specific meaning because it includes any and all hours logged as value-added, 
even those hours spent participating in a recreational event. However, if Coast Guard 
leadership looks upon the Auxiliary as primarily an affiliation organization whose 
outcomes are of secondary importance, perhaps 5.58 to 1 could be used as a base-line for 
Auxiliary sub-programmatic support; if a sub-program does not deliver that baseline 
involvement return on investment, it is too costly. In this study, the Surface and Air 
Operations Support sub-programs fall in this category. In order for Surface Operations 
Support to meet this standard, direct sub-programmatic funding would be mostly 
eliminated, leaving just FTE support costs. Aviation Operations Support could not meet 
this standard, even if all direct programmatic funding were eliminated, due to necessary 
FTE support costs. Again, this is presented for completeness of review and consideration; 
cutting funding to the Surface Operations Support sub-program is not being proposed for 
action. 
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E. RESOURCE-NEUTRAL POLICY OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Resource Donor—Auxiliary Aviation 
The Auxiliary Air Operations Support sub-program, as identified in Table 6, is the 
only operational sub-program with a negative return on investment; it also offers no 
support for the first Auxiliary mission of supporting recreational boating safety, only 
minimal contributions for the second Auxiliary mission of supporting Coast Guard 
operations, and is often tasked for logistics support or low priority tasks—the third and 
lowest Auxiliary mission. The approximately $1.8M Auxiliary programmatic funding 
presently dedicated to the aviation sub-program could be reallocated elsewhere within the 
Auxiliary program. While this would eliminate the Auxiliary aviation sub-program, this 
action would not necessarily require the complete elimination of volunteer aviation 
support for the Coast Guard; the Civil Air Patrol already performs the same duties. 
There are occasions where volunteer-piloted civil aircraft support of Coast Guard 
missions is both appropriate and economical. This prompted a secondary investigation 
into the appropriateness and expense of reassigning the Auxiliary Aviation mission to the 
Civil Air Patrol (CAP)—a mini analysis of its own. That detailed analysis can be found in 
Appendix B. 
The outcome of that analysis is that the U.S. Air Force’s auxiliary CAP could 
absorb the members, assets, and missions of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary aviation sub-
program and provide similar volunteer aviation services back to the Coast Guard on a 
reimbursable basis. The shifts in the general volunteerism culture and American economy 
have caused a reduction in the personal expenses that volunteers are willing to absorb in 
the course of fulfilling their volunteer interests. Additionally, government regulation has 
swelled the expense and complexity of owning and operating a civil aircraft beyond the 
grasp of many Americans. The CAP has a sound concept in providing and maintaining 
federally owned aircraft—equipped with technology suites well beyond those of private 
owners. 
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The CAP operates in every U.S. state, including Alaska, where there is no 
Auxiliary aviation program. Despite its expanse and considerable active duty Coast 
Guard aviation presence, the decision was made decades ago to disallow an Auxiliary 
aviation program in the Seventeenth Coast Guard district (state of Alaska). The reported 
reason for that policy decision is that the region is too hazardous—and therefore risky—
for the Coast Guard to properly administer and task volunteer aviators. With the opening 
of Arctic waters, and the growth of human activity in northern Alaska, there is a need for 
an increased government presence in the region. The CAP operates in Alaska and could 
offer volunteer resources for some of the Coast Guard’s low-risk missions in the south, 
allowing military assets to be used for the increasing demand of higher priority missions. 
On March 1, 2012, the Civil Air Patrol Director of Operations gave a presentation 
to the Coast Guard Office of Search and Rescue at Coast Guard Headquarters. In that 
briefing which offered CAP “augmentation” to the Auxiliary aviation program, the 
“typical” hourly chargeable agency mission expense of $150 per hour was given—a cost 
of only $10 per hour more than the effective current cost for the Coast Guard to maintain 
an in-house volunteer aviation support (see Appendix B for explanation). The CAP 
official made it clear to the Coast Guard that CAP has the resources, training, and interest 
to assist in the Coast Guard’s volunteer aviation missions, at a cost comparable to what 
the Coast Guard is already paying to maintain its non-standard, and lesser-equipped 
program. The CAP maintains a fleet of government-furnished aircraft with fully 
supported, state of the art technology packages, and specialized capabilities that far 
exceed Auxiliary capabilities. The Coast Guard could use a portion of the $1.0M aviation 
SAMA funding, which already resides outside the Auxiliary program budget, to fund as-
needed CAP support. In place of maintaining an aviation minority within its nautically 
focused volunteer program, those SAMA resources (or perhaps only a mere portion of 
those resources) could be reallocated to directly pay for actual missions performed.  
In today’s technological age, employing advanced sensoring and communications, 
maintaining a physical observation presence through conducting volunteer Maritime 
Observation Mission (MOM) patrols is outmoded (MOM is discussed further in 
Appendix B). It has become a catchall for non-critical and often self-initiated volunteer 
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aviator activity—a euphemism. If the thousands of hours of non-critical Auxiliary 
member initiated or prompted aviation MOM patrols—and their accompanying financial 
reimbursements—were reigned-in and task-focused, there would be a considerable cost 
savings to the organization. These same volunteers, employing their Auxiliary 
experience, yet integrated into and overseen by an agency whose primary purpose is 
providing aviation resources, could better contribute to the security needs of the nation, 
and likely increase the safety of the volunteers. 
 Finding #14. The Civil Air Patrol is capable of providing volunteer 
aviation services to the Coast Guard at an as-needed hourly rate 
comparable to those provided by the Auxiliary Aviation sub-program. 
2. Resource Reallocation—Other Auxiliary Programmatic Needs 
Most likely, a compelling future funding need will drive the necessary 
identification of a within-program funding source (Auxiliary Aviation), as opposed to an 
independent and proactive programmatic improvement effort. The Auxiliary program is 
presently operating with several unfunded or under-funded needs. The Auxiliary program 
could immediately use any and all funds made available at any time; the program 
managers could either bolster existing programs and needs, or the funds could be used to 
support new initiatives. There is a regular standing “list” of unfunded needs.102 To date, 
the Auxiliary program has not harvested from within the program to fund those needs; 
they either found funding through the good will of other Coast Guard programs or simply 
remain unfunded. 
The needs and initiatives of the Auxiliary program shift over time. Some are 
resourced while others are not. Because this study may have a significant dwell time, 
only two very general uses for internally reprogramed funds are identified. A current 
needs assessment should be conducted should resource reprogramming take place. 
First, the funds could be used to support existing Auxiliary programmatic needs. 
For example, the AUXDATA program is currently in “care-taker” status due to no 
funding source. The one and only computer program used to track the membership, 
                                                 
102 Minutolo, in discussion with the author, June 18, 2012. 
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qualification, and activity information for the Auxiliary’s 30,000 volunteers is currently 
unsupported and is only receiving anti-virus updates. There is a list of over 50 
programming adjustments that require dedicated programmer action. The Coast Guard 
requires over $1M to fully support the AUXDATA program.103 Additionally, surface 
SAMA is reimbursed at a rate of 35% of calculated cost. Additional funding of surface 
SAMA, making it less costly for volunteers to offer and operate their boats, may turn the 
long-trending loss of boats around, much like it did for aircraft. Also, the limited ranks of 
full-time Director of Auxiliary personnel would certainly put additional employees to 
work, ultimately increasing the oversight and possibly safety of the volunteers. There are 
numerous existing programmatic needs that could immediately absorb any additional 
funding. 
Secondly, the funds could be used to fund new initiatives. The Coast Guard, 
through its experience responding to the Deep Water Horizon oil spill, is implementing a 
Coast Guard-wide Incident Command System training enhancement program—for only 
its active duty and reserve members. The volunteers of the Auxiliary could be 
incorporated in these training and contingency event readiness efforts. Presently, despite 
expressed interest and demonstrated successes, the Auxiliary is being overlooked in this 
area. 
As stated, it is anticipated that a compelling Auxiliary program need, in support of 
either an existing program or a new initiative will likely drive a resource-neutral policy 
shift at some point in the future; those in leadership positions at that time should weigh 
the organizational needs and use this research primarily as a guide to make the difficult 
decisions regarding from where to pull those resources. 
 Finding #15. The Auxiliary program has under-funded demands in both 
general administration and operational programs that could immediately 
use any and all funds reprogrammed from elsewhere within the program. 
                                                 
103 Minutolo, in discussion with the author, June 18, 2012. 
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V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The 15 specific Research Findings are compiled in Table 7 and repeated in 
Appendix C. 
 
Table 7.   Research Findings  
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The primary goal of this study is to assess the return on investment of the major 
operational programs of the Coast Guard Auxiliary by identifying and highlighting 
organizational and volunteer support for those primary programs. Coast Guard leaders 
voice appreciation for the Auxiliary program, yet resourcing has been cut at a steady rate 
since a high-point several decades ago—the exception is an infusion of funds following 
the attacks of 9/11. The volunteer leaders in the Auxiliary have expressed membership 
unhappiness over various concerns, yet this research shows that citizens continue to join 
and the missions continue to be performed. The Auxiliary continues to perform its 
missions despite decreased organizational support by the Coast Guard—for now; while 
decreased resourcing is not presently affecting volunteer recruitment that may change in 
the future. 
Despite fluctuations in Auxiliary membership and boat and aircraft facility 
numbers, the past eight years have shown continued growth in volunteer hours in all but 
one of the operational programs, public education; in general, Auxiliarists are serving 
more hours and executing more missions. Although public education is in gradual decline 
due in part to the successes of “competing” organizations, new internet delivery 
resources, and general declining registration by the public, it remains a successful 
program; the Auxiliary taught over 15,000 boating safety classes in FY 2011, at a direct 
expense to the Coast Guard of just under $15 per class—not per hour, and not per 
student, $15 per several hour class full of students. This appears to be a reasonable 
investment in public RBS outreach and education, a Coast Guard Mission. 
The demographics of the Auxiliary appear to be relatively homogenous: older and 
white. That is viewed as neither positive nor negative in this analysis and does not appear 
to have an immediate influence on the tasking or resourcing of the Auxiliary—the focus 
of this study. The Auxiliary is an official branch of the Coast Guard. Much like the rest of 
government, the Coast Guard seeks to match the demographic representation of the U.S. 
population. The presented data should assist the Coast Guard and Auxiliary, both paid 
and volunteer leadership, in quantitatively assessing present demographic gaps in the 
Auxiliary, and the Nation’s projected demographic composition. The demographic 
makeup of the country, the country’s future volunteers, is changing dramatically. 
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Between 2006 and 2010, there was a 26% decline in Auxiliary surface facilities 
and a 22% decline in Auxiliary aviation facilities. During that same time period, there 
was a 55% decline in U.S. retail powerboat sales and a 5% decline in overall recreational 
vessel registrations. Also during that period, the overall net membership of the Auxiliary 
dipped and returned to approximately the same level. A possible explanation for this is 
that many boat-owning Auxiliarists, following the U.S. market trend, moved away from 
powerboat ownership—and left the Auxiliary—while interest in joining the Auxiliary 
remained strong. The decline in the number of Auxiliary Surface Facilities has been 
relatively consistent since the Auxiliary’s high water mark in the mid 1970s. This is not a 
new circumstance. The combined realities of steadily increasing boat ownership expenses 
and tightening Coast Guard regulations will likely continue this 40-year trend. In the 
author’s opinion, the decline in the number of boats is not a condition that can be 
reversed unless the Coast Guard devotes additional resources to the Surface Operations 
Support sub-program, which already consumes almost 25% of Auxiliary programmatic 
resources. The volunteer members of the Auxiliary are progressively offering fewer and 
fewer facilities, and are pursing activities other than Surface and Air Operations Support. 
The participation in the Auxiliary Aviation program appears to be driven heavily 
by the financial support provided by the Coast Guard; the number of aircraft tripled in the 
years following the introduction of SAMA in 1998, and then rapidly declined following 
the implementation and enforcement of increased engine maintenance (safety) 
requirements in 2003. In contrast, the introduction of SAMA for boat owner/operators in 
2006 had little to no influence on the decades-long decline in the number of surface 
facilities in use in the Auxiliary. Without including additional supporting anecdotal 
observations of the program, the purely statistical information presented indicates that the 
Auxiliary Aviation program exists primarily because of the program’s heavy 
subsidization by the Coast Guard. That prompts the questions, “What are the motives of 
some in the Auxiliary aviation program?” and “Do the organizational outcomes/benefits 
to the Coast Guard justify the costs of Auxiliary Aviation?” The negative returns on both 
mission-outcome and volunteer-involvement return on investment indicate that the 
answer to the second question is likely, “No.” However, the Coast Guard is not a for-
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profit organization; it is a federal agency, and sometimes negative returns are a necessary 
fact of life. But in a climate where cuts must be made in one area to support another, a 
negative-return program often makes a good donor to support other programs with a 
more favorable return on investment. 
The basic premise of this analysis is that the Coast Guard will provide no new 
resources to the Auxiliary program; if any changes are to be made, they must be resource-
neutral. It is an interesting yet unfortunate reality for the Auxiliary program: despite the 
organizationally miniscule programmatic funding (0.24% of the Coast Guard budget) and 
the demonstrated tremendous return on investment in actual mission outcomes, the 
program stands no practical chance of gaining additional resources. While this study does 
not attempt to study the impacts of increasing or decreasing overall resourcing, there are 
existing programmatic needs that may eventually negatively impact the program if not 
addressed. In the present austere fiscal climate, an undesired yet realistic outcome of this 
study will be for the Coast Guard to use it minimize the impact of reducing the staffing 
and funding to the Auxiliary program, to help address resourcing shortfalls elsewhere in 
the Coast Guard.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
The Auxiliary is touted for its great service for, and economy to, the Coast Guard. 
That service at great economy can be both and asset and an obstacle. On one hand, the 
Auxiliary’s volunteer members regularly receive respect and praise for their selfless 
service; on the other hand, the Coast Guard may be inclined to forget that volunteers are 
not completely free. This study presents that the Auxiliary is currently sound, but some 
attention by Coast Guard leadership could positively impact its present and future 
service. Having studied historic trends in volunteer membership activity, Coast Guard 
resourcing, and programmatic outcomes, several policy and resourcing opportunities 
present themselves.  
This study offers five recommendations and a sixth section offering potential 
future influences, which are discussed in detail in this section.  
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In brief, the recommendations are:  
1)  Focus on the mission. 
2)  Monitor and Prepare for the eventual impact of decreasing boat facilities.  
3)  Encourage and support volunteer racial/ethnic diversity.  
4)  Consider available programmatic resourcing when tasking the Auxiliary. 
5)  Eliminate the aviation sub-program and reprogram the funds as 
necessary—within the Auxiliary program. 
Detailed recommendations: 
1)  “Build the Program, and They Will Come…”—Focus on the Mission 
The Coast Guard should provide the appropriate resourcing and policy 
guidance for the Auxiliary sub-programs it most desires volunteer support, even if 
that means short-term losses in membership from volunteers with special interests 
outside of those sub-programs. If the Coast Guard’s primary focus is on the mission, 
and not just volunteer recruitment and retention, volunteers will continue to serve 
as permitted by the Coast Guard. (Supported by Findings 1, 2, 4, 5) 
What does the Coast Guard need of its volunteers? This simple question is not 
regularly addressed—either directly or with any specific clarity. The most transparent 
guidance that the Auxiliary has is the Coast Guard Auxiliary Policy Statement, which 
was modified and signed by the current Commandant of the Coast Guard when he 
assumed command in the spring of 2010.104 This one-page document broad-brushes three 
prioritized overarching Auxiliary missions: 1) to promote and improve recreational 
boating safety, 2) to augment Coast Guard crews and facilities, and 3) and to support 
operational, administrative, and logistical requirements. Unless those priorities shift, they 
remain the “standing orders” for other Coast Guard leaders to follow.  
A later recommendation identifies an opportunity to shift resources from a lesser-
performing sub-program (Auxiliary aviation sub-program) that supports operational 
administrative and logistical requirements (a third priority mission). The recommendation 
                                                 
104 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Association, District 11 Southern Region, Robert J. Papp, 
Commandant, “U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Policy Statement,” (n.d.), 
http://www.d11s.org/leadership/commandant-policy.php. 
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proposes to bolster existing higher ROI sub-programs and to support the higher priority 
missions of promoting and improving recreational boating safety or augmenting Coast 
Guard crews and missions (first and second priority missions, respectively). It should be 
anticipated that the elimination of the Auxiliary aviation sub-program and a shift in 
volunteer aviation support of the Coast Guard from the Coast Guard Auxiliary to another 
organization would cause a minor decrease in membership. In addition to the 
approximately 666 aviator members who would be informed that they could no longer fly 
as Auxiliarists, there likely are some non-aviator volunteers who would object to the 
policy shift, and quit. As was seen in several previous policy shifts, the decline would be 
temporary and the pre-event growth would be quickly restored. 
Despite generally increased activity by the Auxiliarists who are qualified and 
serve aboard boats and aircraft, their numbers are decreasing and this trend will 
eventually become unsustainable. With the exception of vessel examination, which has 
experienced a minor net growth, progressively fewer Auxiliarists are qualified and 
participate in the traditional Auxiliary RBS related sub-programs. Volunteers are 
pursuing more operationally focused activities such as serving directly with Coast Guard 
members aboard Coast Guard units or assisting in regulatory in marine safety missions. 
Along with authorized and supported sub-programs, there are some Auxiliarists who join 
the organization with little interest in supporting existing missions. Occasionally, these 
volunteers have a personal agenda and use their Auxiliary membership to independently 
pursue that agenda. Volunteers who “freelance” in the Auxiliary may offer limited 
positive outcomes and can potentially create an unnecessary, unapproved, and otherwise 
disruptive liability to the Coast Guard when not approved by Auxiliary program 
managers. The Coast Guard should recognize this volunteer dynamic and manage 
Auxiliarist expectations by clearly and regularly stating that while appreciating volunteer 
interests, the Coast Guard has specific support needs that they are asked to support; 
please share ideas for improvement, while contributing to existing approved Auxiliary 
missions. If a volunteer does not meet organizational expectations, and chooses not to 
support authorized activities, he or she should not be permitted to participate in the 
Auxiliary. Despite some voiced complaints and occasional membership dips, volunteers 
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continue to join the Auxiliary. The Coast Guard should support the desired Auxiliary 
missions, discourage un-resourced activity, and encourage volunteers whose interests do 
not align with that mission set to pursue participation in another valued volunteer 
organization. 
2) “Coming Ashore”—Decreasing Boat Facilities 
The Coast Guard should acknowledge that there will eventually be a turn in 
the trend of fewer qualified Auxiliarists performing more Surface Operations 
missions, with fewer boats. The trend in hours served and missions performed 
should be monitored for a tipping point where economic considerations likely 
become a controlling influence for Surface Operations, similar to Aviation 
Operations. That point in the future will offer a decision point: If volunteer support 
through privately owned boats is still desired, an infusion of resources will be 
required to turn the trend and continue their service—likely at a negative return on 
investment. Otherwise, the Surface Operations sub-program should be reviewed for 
viability and alternative uses for its 25% share of the Auxiliary’s programmatic 
resourcing. The Surface Operations sub-program is currently healthy and provides 
a positive return on investment; no changes are recommended. (Supported by 
Findings 4, 5) 
Many new Auxiliarists do not own boats, and most certainly do not own aircraft; 
it is likely that many are joining the Auxiliary to participate in the newer, non-boating 
related, Coast Guard support activities. 
The Auxiliary has been losing boats at a steady rate over the past 40 years. The 
expense of boat ownership and meeting Auxiliary facility equipage and maintenance 
standards is high, and will continue to grow into the foreseeable future. As presented in 
Chapter IV, the ratio of the overall number of Auxiliarists per boat facility has grown 
from 2.2 in 1973 to 9.8 in 2011. Many new Auxiliary members neither own a boat nor are 
interested in boating. This study shows that there is no decline in the Boat Operations 
Support sub-program’s performance, but that time will arrive at some point in the future. 
The Coast Guard should consider this when plotting the future mission tasking of the 
Auxiliary. 
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3) “Future Volunteers”—Racial/Ethnic Diversity 
The Coast Guard should assess the present membership characteristics of the 
Auxiliary and anticipate the impacts of trending U.S. volunteer interests and 
demographic shifts on Auxiliary participation. (Supported by Findings 2, 4, 8, 9) 
The membership of the Auxiliary is largely older and White. That is known and is 
regularly discussed by both the volunteer Auxiliary and military Coast Guard leadership. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, previous studies addressed the membership of women in the 
Auxiliary; at over 22% of present Auxiliary membership and comparable representation 
in leadership positions, there do not appear to be barriers to participation for women. 
While female representation is outside the scope of this study, this present data point may 
support future research and consideration. This study presents evidence that Hispanics are 
already the largest American minority group, and their representation is growing rapidly. 
The Coast Guard should determine if there are trends in the activities specific to this 
group that may be worth note; there could possibly be specific interests or barriers to 
participation that the Coast Guard could address to enhance future volunteer support for 
the Coast Guard.  
The Auxiliary is a very formal and hierarchical organization: the volunteers are 
organized into various units and hold positions with specific responsibilities within them; 
the written doctrine is oftentimes stifling (the main organizational manual is 710 pages 
long—and there are numerous others…); the uniforms are military look-alikes; and 
members are expected to act within specific guidelines, as an obligation of membership. 
This structure appealed to the volunteers of the 1950s–1970s. As mentioned in the 
Literature Review, the demographic is changing and contentment with that model is 
shifting. While it has already been stated, this study is not a review of the culture of the 
organization, only the resourcing and tasking of its present and near-future state. It is 
important to mention that there is a natural evolution and cultural shift taking place that 
the organization may not be addressing. Should events cause that shift to make a leap, the 
Auxiliary may be left without members. In addition to studying the tangible resourcing 
and tasking, the Coast Guard should expend some effort performing some strategic 
planning for the volunteer demographics of the future. 
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By seeking ethnic and racial diversity, the Auxiliary will make steps toward 
bolstering the overall volunteer membership ranks. It appears that targeted recruiting in 
the 1970s increased the representation of women in the Auxiliary. Current efforts related 
to targeted recruiting may not be sufficient to affect minority representation. The Coast 
Guard should research whether its existing policies and practices prevent volunteers from 
joining the Auxiliary and supporting its missions. This is differentiated from catering to a 
special interest or niche volunteer; perhaps existing minimally resourced programs such 
as the Auxiliary Interpreter sub-program (virtually “free” to the Coast Guard), which 
harnesses the language skills of hundreds of volunteers to support the missions of the 
Coast Guard and multiple other U.S. Government agencies, could be highlighted or 
enhanced. It is possible that a program in which these culturally diverse and multi-lingual 
Auxiliarists could help impart their language skills to Coast Guard members, giving them 
additional tools in a diversifying world. 
In addition to considering new missions versus existing missions, this study 
presents evidence that the Auxiliary is experiencing a shift in the interest and 
participation habits of existing Auxiliarists. This shift could reflect generational dynamics 
in the types of missions of interest to the volunteers and their behaviors. Missions such as 
teaching classes, conducting on-the-water patrols, and performing weekend safety checks 
of recreational boats are the foundation missions of the older Auxiliary members. They 
are also regularly occurring group activities. The newer missions of marine safety and 
direct Coast Guard unit support are generally being pursued by the younger Baby 
Boomer and Generation X members, and are gradually supplanting the traditional 
Auxiliary missions that require attendance at organized and scheduled events. Perhaps 
modifying the scheduling of some events would help grow participation. 
A newcomer to the Auxiliary mission profile is the opportunity for Auxiliarists to 
provide a direct contribution to Coast Guard contingency operations. The contribution of 
Auxiliarists by assuming various roles in the Incident Command System (ICS) during the 
Coast Guard’s Deep Water Horizon oil spill response was previously discussed, and 
offers an example of a broad future opportunity for Auxiliarists. Coast Guard leadership 
should acknowledge the heavy surge demands placed upon the Coast Guard during that 
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response and leverage its volunteer component, which comprises 35% of the extended 
“Team Coast Guard” workforce, to provide support during responses. Auxiliarists could 
add regionally dispersed depth to the numbers of vetted and qualified “teammates.” 
Auxiliarists could gainfully contribute to future large-scale contingency responses—if 
properly trained and practiced in advance. 
4) “Balance the Checkbook”—Programmatic Resourcing 
Assuming additional funding is unavailable, the Coast Guard should assess 
the outcomes and required resourcing when suggesting a new Auxiliary program or 
discussing the utility of an existing Auxiliary program. (Supported by Findings 10, 
11, 12, 15) 
This study does not seek to offer a prescriptive “solution” to an Auxiliary 
“problem.” Given the assumption that gaining additional resources to the Auxiliary 
program (either full-time program managers or direct funding) are unlikely, this research 
presents an opportunity to increase the return on the existing investment. In an ideal 
world, this investment would increase, to support growing organizational needs and 
shifting volunteer interests. But the Auxiliary program exists in a very much less-than-
ideal world. The existing sub-programs are reviewed herein with a focus of maximizing 
that return by reprogramming resources from within.  
The presented recommendations deliberately do not offer a prescriptive road map 
for how to re-use the resources gained by reprogramming existing resources; existing 
Auxiliary programmatic needs could immediately absorb them. Increasing support to 
existing missions in the form of oversight, training, and equipment, intuitively increases 
the proficiency, safety, and performance of those missions. This study only presents the 
first half of the equation: where to find the resources necessary to improve the return on 
investment of the Auxiliary by funding existing or future program elements. If Coast 
Guard Leadership intends to pursue any programmatic shifts in the future, this study 
suggests that a broad, inclusive, and timely consideration of needs and opportunities be 
performed at that time in order to assess the existing programmatic needs and the impact 
of adding additional sub-programs to the resourcing demands of the Auxiliary. Adding  
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new demands on existing resources ultimately drives down the level of support available 
in the form or training, equipment, and oversight—and could adversely affect volunteer 
safety and Coast Guard liability. 
Additional or reprogrammed resources could be applied to shore existing 
programmatic needs, or they could also be used to create new sub-programs. Experience 
shows that reprogramming the savings to only support existing requirements would not 
be a popular outcome. Some would prefer that something new and exciting be—at least 
partially—created as a result of this effort in order for it to gain the support of most Coast 
Guard leaders and/or volunteer Auxiliarists. Past Auxiliary mission scope, creep has 
already been addressed; perhaps it is time for the Coast Guard to make the difficult 
decision to stabilize the resource base of its volunteer branch and not seek newer and 
arguably more exciting uses. It is recommended that, unless existing Auxiliary 
programmatic resourcing needs are otherwise met, harvested funding should first support 
existing shortfalls or weaknesses prior to funding new initiatives. 
A viable and negligible-cost opportunity exists to refocus Auxiliarist efforts 
where the Coast Guard can direct future Auxiliary support, in the existing Coast Guard 
Unit Support sub-program, where Auxiliarists integrate and serve at Coast Guard units. 
Auxiliarist interest and resulting support during the Deep Water Horizon oil spill 
response of 2010–2011, which required the largest Coast Guard mobilization and 
response since World War II, proved that the Auxiliary could serve as a contingency 
support force. The Auxiliary can support and supplement local Coast Guard operations 
during periods when the Coast Guard is extended beyond routine operating capacities. 
One can think of the Auxiliary as increasing the Coast Guard’s “bench strength” (football 
team analogy). While some members of the Auxiliary opt to perform routine boating-
related operations, as have been performed for the past 70+ years, the “growth market” is 
contingency support. This in no way suggests or recommends that Auxiliary volunteers 
should be front-line responders; on the contrary, Auxiliary related issues during the Deep 
Water Horizon response proved deploying volunteers during a contingency response to 
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be wrought with problems, enough and of sufficient severity to make it ill-advised.105 
However, this does suggest that these vetted and trained volunteers can support the Coast 
Guard in other support roles—locally. For example, when a future event requires the 
deployment of an active duty Coast Guardsman from a Coast Guard unit, trained 
Auxiliarists in a local commuting distance to the contributing unit could pool their 
availability and perform a majority of that member’s duties for a protracted period of 
time; five to 10 Auxiliarists could each contribute a day or a period of time each week to 
assist in maintaining that Coast Guard unit’s level of readiness during a Coast Guard 
response elsewhere. 
5) “Final Approach”—Eliminate the Aviation Sub-Program 
The Coast Guard should eliminate the Auxiliary Aviation sub-program, 
collaborate with the Civil Air Patrol to perform appropriate duties as needed, and 
reprogram the savings within the Auxiliary program. (Supported by Findings 1, 3, 
6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15) 
Specifically, the Coast Guard should terminate the Auxiliary Aviation sub-
program, harvest the approximately $1.8M funding that directly supports the program, 
and re-use those funds, in the absence of more compelling needs, to stabilize existing 
programmatic funding shortfalls, and to support training Auxiliarists in Incident 
Command System and other skills of value during a contingency response. In addition to 
the $1.8M saved in direct sub-programmatic funding, this would also save approximately 
$1.0M in aviation SAMA funding; this $1.0M could be used as a baseline to fund CAP 
support charges. 
It is strongly encouraged that the Coast Guard act on this recommendation in its 
entirety; the Coast Guard should not simply defund the Auxiliary aviation sub-program 
without reinvesting the harvested funds in its volunteer branch, which provides valuable 
outcomes and generally delivers a positive volunteer effort return on investment. It is also 
encouraged that the Coast Guard allow the Auxiliary program to reinvest the $450K in 
full-time equivalent employee value that currently manages the aviation sub-program; the 
                                                 
105 Michael D. Barner, Internal Coast Guard Headquarters White Paper to CG-5353. “Barriers to 
Nation-Wide CG Auxiliary Participation in DWH Response,” January 19, 2011. 
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already small team of Coast Guard Officers, Petty Officers, and Civilians dedicated to the 
Auxiliary program are already overtasked.106 Allowing the Auxiliary program’s full time 
employees to remain and reallocate their time across existing demands would allow them 
to better support the diverse administrative needs of the Coast Guard’s 30,000 volunteers 
and the remaining sub-programs. 
The termination of the Auxiliary aviation sub-program would take several 
months. Appropriately, it should have a gradual sunset and terminate before the end of a 
fiscal year. During that time, a group of combined Coast Guard and Auxiliary subject 
matter experts should identify specific opportunities and the requisite funding needs—up 
to the approximately $1.8M calculated herein. This study intentionally does not 
specifically propose those opportunities and needs, because they are complex and change 
over time. Several current opportunities such as supporting the needs of the AUXDATA 
membership database and contingency support training for Auxiliarists are included as 
contemporary examples, but a thorough and timely review should be conducted at that 
point in time, should a resource reprogramming effort take place. 
This recommendation is direct and blunt. To the eye of a researcher, defunding 
and eliminating a program could be a simple task. In reality there are 666 people who 
currently volunteer in the Auxiliary—albeit in a niche—who would have to either change 
their mode of volunteerism in order to remain in the Auxiliary, or leave the Auxiliary. 
Many of these aviation-oriented individuals have contributed honorably and are very 
much a part of the Auxiliary membership’s culture. The membership of the Auxiliary, by 
the nature of their volunteer affiliation and conformance with a military and government 
organization, and the wearing of military uniforms often indistinguishable from that of 
active duty Coast Guard men and women, typically understand the organization is not a 
democracy. There are appointed (not elected) Coast Guard Officers in charge, and their 
decisions are final. Most Auxiliarists understand and embrace this principle. But, the  
 
 
                                                 
106 Barner, Internal Coast Guard Headquarters White Paper. “USCG Regional Director of Auxiliary 
Office Staffing Study.  
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responsible Officers charged with leading these volunteers must keep in mind that 
Auxiliarists are not active duty military members; they are volunteers who can (and do) 
quit when unhappy with the organization. 
In presenting change to volunteers, even uniformed volunteers, one must properly 
frame the change. As Dr. Philip Zimbardo wrote, “We are adverse to things that are 
framed as potential losses and prefer what is presented to us as a gain, even when the 
ratio of positive to negative prognoses is the same. We don’t want a 40% chance of 
losing X over Y, but we do want the 60% chance of gaining Y over X.”107 These 
dedicated and experienced volunteers should not be told that a change is being proposed 
due to an inefficiency or low result. Rather, the frame should be that the Coast Guard 
recognizes and appreciates their contribution, and has found an “opportunity” for them to 
continue to perform that important work—elsewhere. 
In the case of potentially shifting the Auxiliary Aviation program to the Civil Air 
Patrol, the presentation could include both framing and straightforward facts. The 
training and support that CAP would provide, with the full backing of the Air Force, 
easily exceeds that offered by the Coast Guard. The resourcing, in the form of corporately 
owned aircraft, greatly broadened mission and geographic diversity, increased training 
support, and 50-times larger like-focused aviator membership, should be a natural draw 
for Auxiliary Aviators. However, it is anticipated that should a business decision to 
organizationally shift the responsibility and oversight of volunteer aviator support for the 
Coast Guard to CAP, some pilot Auxiliarists will feel unappreciated or worse, betrayed. 
Should this proposal be implemented, Coast Guard pilots, people who regularly 
work with and better understand this small volunteer pool’s motivation, and sometimes-
emotional association with the Coast Guard, should be consulted for their 
recommendations. To fully understand why these volunteers currently choose to associate 
with the Coast Guard Auxiliary and have not already shifted to CAP is to begin to 
formulate the frame to help them transition to a new organization. It should be 
                                                 
107 Philip Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York, New 
York: Random House, 2008), 455; D. Kahnerman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 262–91; A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Loss Aversion in 
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communicated to this volunteer cadre that their sense of patriotic pride in volunteerism, 
as well as their tangible and intangible needs, whatever they are, can be met just as well if 
not better, by another organization—CAP.  
It would also be wise to include the full-time Air Force CAP program managers—
the Air Force Officers who parallel their Coast Guard Counterparts—in this decision. 
Once an agreement is made by the two military services regarding how to continue the 
service provided to the other, the volunteer leadership of the two organizations should be 
brought in, briefed on the goal, and asked to work together to formulate a plan. An 
execution plan created by the volunteers—for the volunteers—meeting the organizational 
needs of both services, would likely be much more successful than one “imposed” on the 
two volunteer organizations by the two military services. 
6) The Unexpected—What if… 
The Auxiliary is strong and successful today. How would this proposal—and 
more importantly, the Auxiliary—respond to a “Black Swan” or a dramatically 
impacting, unlikely, and unexpected event? The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
were Black Swan events; they caught America off-guard, were devastating, and changed 
the course of history. The attacks had a great impact on the Auxiliary as well. In addition 
to the Coast Guard calling on the Auxiliary to backfill, supplement, and independently 
assist the Coast Guard in its numerous new Homeland Security missions, it also brought 
significant changes to the background screening process and formality of membership in 
the Auxiliary. In 2004, the Coast Guard instituted the Personnel Security Investigations 
(PSI) process for the Auxiliary. The membership Figure (Figure 5) shown in Chapter IV 
reflected a net loss of 9,000 members, from 36,000 down to 27,000 between 2004 and 
2007. That marked impact on membership was cause for great alarm during that 
timeframe. In the five years since that “correction,” the Auxiliary membership is growing 
at a steady rate comparable to the pre-PSI levels, and PSIs are an accepted requirement of 
membership among all members. It raised the bar for membership. Statistics show that 
despite the temporary decrease in membership, the Auxiliary program’s performance 
numbers remained constant and even increased during that period. Refer back to Figures  
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in Chapter IV. One could postulate that those who left were contributing minimally in the 
first place. In hindsight, the necessary implementation of PSIs did not hurt the Auxiliary 
program; and it may have improved the overall quality of the organization. 
The Deep Water Horizon oil spill could be considered another Black Swan event. 
However, while it greatly taxed the Coast Guard and stretched its capabilities to the limit, 
it fell squarely within existing Coast Guard responsibilities and doctrine. Unlike 9/11, the 
Deep Water Horizon oil spill response did not cause a major organizational change in the 
Coast Guard. Other major natural and man-caused catastrophes, even those large enough 
to be labeled Black Swans, will again prompt the Coast Guard to turn to the Auxiliary to 
assist, but would likely be supported within existing policy and not affect the Auxiliary 
program as a whole. 
What if a truly Black Swan event was to occur—something previously 
unpredicted and arguably unpredictable: extraterrestrials land in Washington DC, an 
electro-magnetic pulse from the Sun disrupts electricity and electronics worldwide, the 
oceans spontaneously rise several feet over-night? Whether volunteer pilots are members 
of one organization or another would gain little attention, as there would be more 
important things to worry about. 
Smaller (non-alien) Black Swan events are likely enough that they should be 
considered. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National 
Preparedness Directorate is initiating a new national program in August 2012: the 
FEMA-devoted unit of the AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps entitled the 
FEMA Corps. The FEMA Corps will initially start with 1,600 full-time volunteer 
members (similar to the Peace Corps model). The concept is that these trained volunteers 
will be deployable and will respond to major emergencies alongside full-time paid 
responders.108 It is possible that this response-oriented volunteer organization may appeal 
to existing Auxiliary members. Even though the Auxiliary is a part-time organization,  
 
 
                                                 
108 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Corps,” (n.d.), 
http://www.fema.gov/about/employees/femacorps.shtm. 
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some members may leave the organization to join FEMA Corps. It is possible that this or 
other organizations could be formed and would compete for the demographic that 
currently volunteers for the Coast Guard.  
In summary, the Auxiliary is a healthy organization and this proposal offers an 
incremental improvement to the status quo, not a correction to a problem. If Coast Guard 
leadership enacts this proposal, they should coordinate the effort between both the 
military and volunteer leaders of both the Auxiliary and Civil Air Patrol. The savings 
realized could be used to stabilize funding for existing programs as well as new Auxiliary 
initiatives—or they could also be “harvested” from the Auxiliary program altogether; but 
that would negatively impact the program and is not advised. 
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This study is a policy analysis of the six main operational sub-programs of the 
Coast Guard Auxiliary. It includes volunteer participation and Coast Guard resourcing 
trends for the Auxiliary in the form of money and full-time employee support. It also 
presents the present Auxiliary demographics and how that may or may not align with the 
future U.S. population, and more importantly, Coast Guard goals. Lastly, it presents two 
return-on-investment concepts, one assigning organizational unit costs to outcomes, the 
other assigning a value to volunteer participation or effort. 
Through looking at long-term trends and calculating returns-on-investment among 
these sub-programs, Auxiliary aviation stands out from the others as having a negative 
return, limited membership and outcomes, and can be readily re-assigned to another 
federal agency—the U.S. Air Force’s Civil Air Patrol. The resources of this sub-program 
should be reprogrammed to support other Auxiliary programmatic needs. 
The secondary intent of this study is to present a wealth of information and data in 
one location for others to use for completely unrelated uses in the future, provided the 
assumptions and limitations are considered. This study is intended for some to simply 
read and learn more about where the Auxiliary fits in to the big picture of the Coast 
Guard, and how it compares to similar volunteer organizations throughout the world. 
B. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The primary research question is, “How can the U.S. Coast Guard adapt the U.S. 
Coast Guard Auxiliary to better align its tasking and maximize volunteer support of 
Coast Guard Missions, within existing programmatic resourcing?” This is broken down 
into three distinct sub-questions. 
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1. Research Questions 
 What Return on Investment Do the Existing Auxiliary Sub-Programs 
Offer the Coast Guard? This is directly and quantitatively answered in 
Table 6. 
 In What Auxiliary Program Mission Areas Could the Coast Guard Best 
Leverage Volunteer Interests, Skills, and Participation in the Next Several 
Years? In general, volunteers are not bringing boats and aircraft with them 
when they join the Auxiliary anymore. While Auxiliary boats and aircraft 
are less expensive to operate than the Coast Guard assets they supplement, 
they comprise a large portion of the resourcing demands of the program. 
The four other operational sub-programs all have returns many times 
greater than the investment. In recent years, the marine safety and Coast 
Guard unit support sub-programs have grown well; they require minimal 
funding and permit volunteers to work directly with operational Coast 
Guardsmen, a goal of many new Auxiliarists. These two programs show 
the greatest promise in the near future. Additionally, a new initiative to 
train Auxiliarists to assist in contingency response support would likely 
draw great volunteer interest. 
 How Can the Existing U.S. Coast Guard Resources Allocated to Support 
the Auxiliary Program Be Adjusted to Maximize Its Effectiveness? 
Funding of approximately $1.8M would be made available for reallocation 
if the Auxiliary aviation sub-program is eliminated and its functions 
assumed by the Civil Air Patrol. Another $1M, currently used to fund 
Auxiliary Aviation SAMA, could be reprogrammed as a baseline to fund 
payments to the Air Force to reimburse CAP support to the Coast Guard. 
The Auxiliary could use that funding to support current programmatic 
needs—or new initiatives. While reallocating the $1.8M to existing needs 
will bolster the existing high-return programs, funding new initiatives may 
draw new volunteers and expand the support the Auxiliary provides the 
Coast Guard. The current federal fiscal climate will likely impose a new 
funding mandate, standing out from others, that will drive the need to 
identify a funding source. What initially started as a proactive effort at the 
onset of this research 12 months ago will likely support a program 
downsizing effort at its completion. Any available funds should be used to 
bolster both general Auxiliary programmatic needs, such as AUXDATA, 
and to provide support to high-return programs. 
2. Significance of Research 
This research is significant because there are very few people who are aware of 
the Auxiliary program’s long-term trends in service, actual outcomes, and (small) cost to 
the Coast Guard. Previous studies included shorter periods of evaluation, and attempted 
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to assign a generalized “value” to participation or effort in the Auxiliary. The intent of 
this study was to give both the military and volunteer leaders better perspective regarding 
actual outcomes and costs, from which to make resource and policy decisions in the near 
future. The additional intent was to consolidate long-scattered data for other researchers 
to use and build upon, keeping in mind the listed data qualifications and assumptions. 
The Coast Guard, and more specifically the Auxiliary, is at a challenging point in 
its history. Tight budgets and manpower requirements have caused the Coast Guard to 
minimally fund and minimally staff the Auxiliary program for years. Those years of 
relative neglect are being compounded by a proliferation of special-interest initiatives 
that require funding and oversight, funding and oversight already overextended across 
existing programs. This research highlights the large traditional programs and calls 
attention to the great return on investment they deliver to the Coast Guard. While special-
interest initiatives drawn some attention, they are largely temporary, regional, and 
organizationally insignificant; they were not a part of this study. 
As previously stated, the author has found no evidence that either the Coast Guard 
or the Auxiliary has used actual resourcing and performance data in any of its 
programmatic decisions in the past 20 years. The data presented in this research is aimed 
to provide Coast Guard leadership with a comprehensive assessment of the Auxiliary 
program—that can facilitate informed decision-making about the future of the program. 
While a historical review of statistics does not directly identify future needs or address 
the changing and often-intangible human factors of leading a complex organization, the 
effort can identify trends and lesser-performing aspects. The Auxiliary program has no 
more “efficiencies to realize” in the status quo; it is the author’s opinion it is time to 
concentrate remaining resources on those sub-programs that deliver the greatest return on 
investment—and limit unresourced programmatic expansion. This resource concentration 
must be done if the Coast Guard expects the Auxiliary to continue to perform in a 
meaningful fashion. 
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C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
One of the duties of organizational leadership is to manage the regular supply of 
“great ideas.” Most members of an organization have opinions, “Why don’t we just….” 
or “If I were in charge, I’d….” It is with this awareness that the great idea of this work is 
presented. Great ideas can be compared to a work of art; only the originator or creator 
truly understands his or her intent. The work reflects the originator’s understanding and 
biases of the world and includes or focuses on what the originator sees as important. This 
“great idea” of reprogramming funding from the Auxiliary aviation sub-program to other 
Auxiliary programmatic needs is presented with an experienced understanding of the 
mechanics of the Coast Guard’s volunteer workforce. It is also presented from the frame 
of statistics, efficiencies, and effectiveness—for others to improve upon.  
Collecting Auxiliary historical data was a challenge, especially for resourcing 
information predating 2005. This limited the scope and direction of this study; some 
aspects of the Auxiliary simply could not be researched because the information was 
unavailable. The data that was found is captured herein and, hopefully, is presented in a 
fashion that future researchers can use for completely unrelated purposes. I recommend 
the Coast Guard and Auxiliary increase and standardize the recording of Auxiliary 
resourcing and performance data. It is difficult to know where we are going if we do not 
know where we have been. 
At the conclusion of the Literature Review, I wrote: 
Volunteers and volunteerism can be a sensitive topic. It is possible that 
few organizational leaders wish to qualify or quantify limits to their 
financial support of volunteers for fear of appearing unappreciative of the 
volunteer efforts, or otherwise discouraging their affiliation and 
participation. 
That is not just a supposition made without basis; it is my first-hand observation, 
based on my experience as the program manager of the United States Coast Guard 
Auxiliary from 2009 to 2012. Some may read or highlight particular aspects of this work 
and conclude that I do not like or understand the Auxiliary. On the contrary, while this 
study makes recommendations that may be unpopular with some, they are made with a 
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deep appreciation for the hard work of the Coast Guard’s thousands of present and past 
volunteers. These recommendations are made from a position of organizational and 
programmatic exposure that few share, and a realistic expectation of future resourcing; I 
believe that enacting these recommendations would improve an already successful 
government program and improve the Coast Guard’s service to this Nation. 
Through this experience, I have identified two general aspects of formal volunteer 
organizations worthy of assessment: their resourcing and tasking by the supported entity, 
and their culture. I chose to write this thesis regarding the former, which can be readily 
supported with data and can provide quantitative recommendations.  
When I embarked on this endeavour, my intent was to write a thesis regarding the 
latter, the culture of the Auxiliary. The goal was to identify, through research, measures 
that the Coast Guard could take to adjust the culture of the Auxiliary, to improve its 
effectiveness in supporting the Coast Guard. I think there are a few fundamental cultural 
elements within the Auxiliary that may have been successful in the past, but are 
preventing new volunteer interest and contributions. During the past several decades, the 
Coast Guard has become busier and busier; resources, primarily in the form of oversight 
by full-time Coast Guard employees, have been pulled away from the Auxiliary program 
to address new demands. Additionally, Coast Guard leaders are at their capacity 
managing these new demands and have no time to provide the level of leadership and 
thoughtful direction as in the past. As a result, the Auxiliary and its volunteers have 
largely become self-managing. This is readily reflected in the statistic presented that over 
71% of documented volunteer activity in the Auxiliary is “Internal Auxiliary 
Administration.” The Coast Guard should pay renewed attention to its volunteer branch, 
and guide necessary organizational change, as necessary. 
I propose that the Coast Guard commission a formal study of the Auxiliary, by 
outside researchers experienced in studying volunteerism, as was done in 1977 and 1987. 
That future study should specifically assess the existing cultural and organizational 
aspects of the Auxiliary and identify elements that could be detrimental to volunteer 
recruitment and performance, unhealthy to the organization, or would otherwise raise 
concern for a federally funded national volunteer program. However, unlike those 
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previous studies, I am not suggesting (another) survey of membership opinions. Rather, I 
am suggesting that an impartial third party with experience in volunteer culture should 
observe and assess the Auxiliary for opportunities to improve its organizational health 
and contributions to the Coast Guard. 
I offer two examples of culture-influencing policies that might strengthen cultural 
and organizational aspects. These recommendations are not supported by the scope of 
this analysis, but are offered for future review and consideration: 
 First, Auxiliarists elect their own members into leadership, or 
“Commodore” positions; an elected volunteer may not necessarily be the 
most effective leader. He or she also may not hold the skills and 
temperament necessary to interact with Coast Guard leadership - and carry 
out their guidance. I suggest that the Coast Guard should review the 
Commodore election process and consider implementing a “best 
qualified” selection process (selected by the Coast Guard) akin to the 
Coast Guard active duty assignment process; people with certain 
experiential and performance prerequisites may request consideration for a 
position, but ultimately a Coast Guard Operational Commander makes that 
selection and appointment—and can direct that person’s replacement if 
necessary. 
 Second, Auxiliarists are permitted (often perceived required) to wear 
Coast Guard uniforms. The Coast Guard should review the pros and cons 
of this and consider eliminating the allowance for Auxiliarists to wear 
uniforms, or at least dramatically “demilitarize” its organizational 
clothing. The reason for this review recommendation is twofold: While an 
organizational goal as stated by the senior volunteers is to draw diverse—
particularly younger—members, there is building anecdotal evidence that 
uniforms actually deter the very demographic so vigorously sought by the 
present membership. Also, the uniforms are so closely similar to 
Commissioned Coast Guard Officer uniforms—complete with almost 
identical, yet silver instead of gold, officer shoulder boards—that the 
public with which the volunteers interact and even the occasional junior 
Coast Guard member get confused and think that these people are Coast 
Guard Officers. This is in spite of the fact that many Auxiliarists often do 
not meet active duty age, weight, and grooming standards. In addition to 
offending some career enlisted Coast Guard members (officer rank 
devices for a volunteer), these uniforms also draw membership interest by 
some who occasionally misrepresent their Department of Homeland 
Security affiliation and (non) military status. These limited few can cause 
great harm to the hard-earned Coast Guard image when they leverage their 
uniformed appearance for either personal gain or to bully others. 
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If Coast Guard Leadership implements the herein presented recommendations, an 
increase in organizational efficiency and effectiveness is anticipated—and hopefully has 
been articulately argued. While reassigning the duties of the Coast Guard’s volunteer 
aviation support mission to the U.S. Air Force’s Civil Air Patrol (CAP) would effectively 
“force” approximately 2% of Auxiliary membership to continue their volunteer efforts 
elsewhere, it would release approximately 10% of the existing Auxiliary programmatic 
funding to shore other important—and higher return on investment—Auxiliary sub-
programs. It is worth repeating that I am somewhat anxious that this effort will be 
misused, resulting in the Coast Guard “harvesting” additional resources from this small 
and successful program, essentially discounting the entire goal of this effort. 
The Auxiliary is a tremendous organization; that is evident because it is has been 
imitated by other organizations throughout the world. I do hope that this work, which 
represents over a thousand hours of effort happily dedicated, helps strengthen the Coast 
Guard in its mission to protect and serve this great Nation. I once saw a sign on a dentist 
office waiting room wall that read, “Ignore your teeth…and they’ll go away.” That 
principle also applies to formal volunteers; unhappy volunteers will “vote with their feet” 
and find another activity. While some argue that appeasing the complaints of some 
volunteers is key to keeping them around, the spirit of this thesis is that properly tasked 




APPENDIX A. RESEARCH METHOD DATA ASSUMPTIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS 
A. AUXILIARY PARTICIPATION 
The overall mission and purpose of the Auxiliary is articulated in U.S. Code, the 
Coast Guard Auxiliary Policy Statement signed by the Coast Guard Commandant, and 
the Coast Guard Auxiliary Manual.109,110,111 The Auxiliary Manual identifies and 
describes over twenty-five individual programs and activities authorized for 
Auxiliarists.112 There are additional programs, but those discussed in the Auxiliary 
Manual have either grown to significant size, require significant resourcing, or have 
otherwise required written policy language. Due to the large number, this policy study 
does not specifically analyze each and every program. It does assess the largest, most 
volunteer-supported authorized Auxiliary activities and their accompanying Coast Guard 
resource demands. The six operational sub-programs, those with the greatest number of 
volunteer participation hours reported in 2011, were identified for study. These six 
programs stand out well in front of any other sub-program/activity and represent over 
78% of the non-“Internal Auxiliary Administration” hours reported in 2011; these six 
sub-programs represent the primary deliverables of the Auxiliary program.  
In addition to analyzing a “snapshot” of the Auxiliary operational programs in FY 
2011, quantitative volunteer participation data over several years is presented. Complete 
statistical information is available for 2003 to present (truncated at 2011 for the purposes 
of this study) from the AUXINFO database. This information is supplemented, as 
possible, by historical records collected through the “United States Coast Guard Record 
                                                 
109 Coast Guard Auxiliary Act of 1996, “Purpose of the Coast Guard Auxiliary.” 
110 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Association, District 11 Southern Region, Robert J. Papp, 
Commandant, “U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Policy Statement.”  
111 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Manual, Commandant Instruction M16790.1G, August 2011. 
112 Ibid., 2–5—2–19. 
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Collection” at East Carolina University.113 This research effort revealed that the 
historical records found at East Carolina University thoroughly capture Auxiliary activity 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Unfortunately, the volume and completeness of 
documentation prior to the 1970s is much less and is likely irretrievable. Additionally, 
little to no documentation was found to be more recent than 1991.  
The East Carolina University Auxiliary record collection was instituted in 1988. 
A possible explanation for the variation in record availability is that the record collection 
effort received much attention and interest among the Auxiliary volunteers during its first 
two years; members initially identified and forwarded records that had been saved in their 
personal files during their Auxiliary membership—and then stopped forwarding new 
information. As a result, there were gaps in almost all Auxiliary program participation 
and performance data between 1991 and the 2003, the first full-year that the online 
AUXDATA/AUXINFO database captured annual data. The author filled these data gaps 
by initiating a nation-wide e-mail request for additional records; the necessary data was 
found in long-time Auxiliarist personal archives (basement file cabinets). AUXDATA’s 
predecessor program, AUXMIS, captured this 1991–2002 data, but it was fixed as of the 
date that data was switched over to AUXDATA (March 23, 2002). AUXMIS data is 
available online, but the pre-2002 annual data only reflects information for members who 
were presently participating in that same activity as of March 23, 2002. That renders the 
AUXMIS data unusable for this research effort.114 While the data trends for the past eight 
years are of primary focus, earlier historical data offers an additional level of perspective.  
B. AUXILIARY DEMOGRAPHICS 
The demographic composition of the Auxiliary volunteers is often discussed 
among the senior volunteer members. These conversations are often framed with a desire 
                                                 
113 The “United States Coast Guard Auxiliary Records Collection” is maintained by East Carolina 
University in Greenville, NC through a private endowment to the university in 1988. The collection is 
accessible to visitors in-person through the J. Y. Joyner Library’s Manuscripts and Rare Books Department 
on the University’s main campus, or online at: http://media.lib.ecu.edu/spclcoll/coastguard/. It is a 
collection of Auxiliarist-donated records and artifacts. Auxiliary records are not archived by the federal 
government.  
114 Anyone with auxiliary-related records, especially dating between 1991 and 2003, is urged to 
forward them to the “United States Coast Guard Record Collection” at East Carolina University.  
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to pursue organizational racial, ethnic, and age diversity. While membership 
demographics influences the culture of an organization (not the focus of this research 
effort), it also may influence volunteer participation and the volunteerism mode desired. 
The present age, sex, and racial demographic composition of most Auxiliary members is 
captured in AUXDATA. Approximately 16.5% of Auxiliary members decline to self-
indicate race in the database; the demographic information for the 83.5% who did self-
indicate race, is presented. Historic data is unavailable because the program is not 
designed to retain the demographic information of members from year to year; 
demographic information is only available for current members entered into the database. 
Therefore, a presentation of racial demographic trends is not possible. The discussion of 
demographics is brief and is intended to present a “snapshot” of Auxiliary membership as 
of the date it was captured. 
C. COAST GUARD RESOURCING OF THE AUXILIARY PROGRAM 
The Coast Guard’s direct resource expenditures for the Auxiliary program 
manifest in two forms: Coast Guard resources provided to Auxiliarists in the form of 
issued personal protective equipment, reimbursements for personal expenses incurred 
while performing volunteer duties, and formal Coast Guard “C-school” training 
expenses; additionally the Coast Guard has 74 full-time paid employees responsible for 
Auxiliary programmatic oversight and management. As explained in the earlier Key 
Assumptions section, indirect government resourcing and donated, non-profit, and state 
support to the Auxiliary program is not part of this study due to the complexity of the 
effort and the limited contribution the information would give to the analysis. The Coast 
Guard has the ability to control—and does control—the direct resources dedicated to the 
Auxiliary program. 
In order to obtain a relative return on investment estimation for each Auxiliary 
sub-program—to answer the first research sub question—one must break down the entire 
program’s funding into estimates of individual sub-programmatic funding. This sub-
programmatic funding breakdown is not practiced, and to the best of the author’s 
knowledge has never before been attempted. As a result, several broad assumptions were 
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made. Those assumptions, while potentially affecting the calculated sub-programmatic 
return on investment, actually result in over estimating individual program returns; this is 
because only funds that clearly and directly support a particular sub-program are included 
in the resourcing estimation. Any general funding that could not be specified as in direct 
support of a particular program was assumed to support “Internal Auxiliary Admin” or 
general Auxiliary program overhead. These resourcing assumptions are articulated in the 
following section. 
1. Direct Funding 
The fiscal year 2011 Auxiliary program’s direct funding was closely analyzed to 
identify funds that clearly support one, and only one, sub-program. Because the historic 
funding data quality quickly declines, only overall Auxiliary programmatic funding for 
previous years was studied. The Coast Guard does not maintain a thorough record of 
historic programmatic funding data, at least not down to the level of detail sought for this 
effort. Fortunately, Mr. Stephen Minutolo, the Administration Branch Chief in the Coast 
Guard Headquarters Auxiliary Division (CG-BSX-11) personally maintained a file of 
funding records dating back to 2001. A synopsis of those direct Auxiliary programmatic 
funding records, with assumptions identified, is presented along with a graphic 
representation of the trend. 
2. Auxiliary Program Management Staffing 
The 74 full-time Auxiliary program management and staff employees (seven at 
Coast Guard Headquarters and 67 in 14 regional offices around the country) were paid a 
total of approximately $7.8M in FY 2011.115 See Table 3 in Chapter IV for a breakdown 
of their military/civilian pay grade. The Coast Guard Headquarters Auxiliary Program 
Management office is composed of seven employees. Their time is assumed to  
 
                                                 
115 Salary estimates in this study were made using the Coast Guard “Standard Personnel Costs” (SPC) 
tables maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard Planning, Resources, and Procurement Directorate. These 
standardized costs are the same values used by the Coast Guard when making human resource-planning 
and budgetary decisions.  
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be 100% attributable to general program management or “Internal Auxiliary 
Administration,” even though a portion of their time is also spent in support of the 
operational sub-programs studied.  
The budgetary equivalence of the time dedicated by the 67 Coast Guard full-time 
employees (FTE) who manage the Auxiliary programs in the field was estimated. A 
questionnaire forwarded by the Coast Guard Headquarters Auxiliary program manager 
was employed; the 14 full-time regional Directors of Auxiliary, Coast Guard Officers, 
were asked to indicate what percentage of their time they and each of their individual 
staff members devote to each of the studied Auxiliary programs. This time is equated to a 
dollar-value in Chapter IV.  
D. DATA QUALIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 Volunteer hours represented in the AUXINFO database are self-reported. 
On occasion, some Auxiliary volunteers have been found to over-report 
their hours or accomplishments; much of the end-of year recognition is 
based on hours served—and some members are quite competitive. 
Conversely, others report that the effort required to ensure a complete 
accounting of their time is tedious, and as a result, do not make the effort 
to report much of their contributed time.116 Auxiliary volunteer leaders 
regularly encourage members to report and record their contributions, to 
accurately represent the organization’s contributions and to facilitate 
analysis—like this study. 
 While capturing the sub-programmatic support of the majority of Coast 
Guard direct funding for the Auxiliary program, the portion that is not 
being assessed is the funding forwarded to the 14 regional Director of 
Auxiliary (DIRAUX) offices to use, at their discretion, for Auxiliary 
programmatic needs (“AFC-30” funds). This amounts to $2.7M (15.5%) 
of the $17.4M attributed to the Auxiliary Program in FY 2011.117 The data 
collection process would be greatly complicated if it were to attempt to 
identify exactly how these funds are expended, and would have a limited 
affect on the analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
116 Steven J. Minutolo (CG-BSX-1 Chief of Administration Branch), in discussion with the author, 
February 22, 2012. 
117 Stephen J. Minutolo, e-mail message to author. “CG-BSX-1 FY-12 Budget Info,” January 13, 
2012.  
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 Formal classroom or “C-school” training is managed directly by CG-BSX-
1 staff. While actual annual expenditures fluctuate from year to year, the 
resourcing levels for each of the 14 Auxiliary “C-schools” are set and have 
remained largely unchanged for several years. The “approved” (versus 
“actual”) expenditure for each course in FY 2011 was studied.118 
 There are 74 full-time Coast Guard employees who manage the Auxiliary 
program (seven at Coast Guard Headquarters and 67 in the field). The 
time demands of the 67 employees in the fourteen regional Director of 
Auxiliary (DIRAUX) offices were polled by CG-BSX-1 and the estimated 
relative time required to support each operational mission is known. It is 
assumed the seven employees assigned to CG-BSX-1 at Coast Guard 
Headquarters are general programmatic overhead and their time will not 
be attributed to any particular program. 
                                                 
118 U.S. Coast Guard, Auxiliary Division (CG-BSX-1) Internal Coast Guard Spreadsheet, “Resources 
Management Performance, Training, Education Branch (FC-513) D/A FPD Executed Quota Report,” June 
20, 2011. 
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APPENDIX B. ALTERNATIVE VOLUNTEER AVIATION SUPPORT 
ANALYSIS—CIVIL AIR PATROL 
Both the Coast Guard and Air Force maintain volunteer aviation programs. The 
redundancy found in these two federal agencies offers an opportunity to implement 
efficiencies by following the example of our Canadian neighbors to the north; the 
Canadian model uses one centrally managed and centrally tasked national volunteer pilot 
and civil aircraft organization in support of national search and rescue needs. In addition 
to cost savings, the implementation of the Canadian model could also increase volunteer 
safety.  
The Coast Guard’s Auxiliary aviation program and the Air Force’s Auxiliary 
aviation program each developed independently of one another in the 1950s. It is unclear 
as to why their incorporation has not been considered before now (at least the author 
found no documentation showing that it was considered). Perhaps it was inter-agency 
rivalry, or perhaps it was out of concern for damaging the message of appreciation for the 
Coast Guard’s volunteers. Canada has one—and only one—federally supported volunteer 
aviation-oriented program that operates efficiently and successfully. Despite some 
organizational differences, the mission execution of all three organizations is essentially 
the same. Political and cultural inertia aside, Coast Guard Auxiliarists could be 
assimilated into the Civil Air Patrol with minimal difficulty.  
There are also several organizational synergies and general volunteerism trends 
that could be addressed through the Air Force absorbing the Coast Guard’s Auxiliary 
aviation program. First, the Air Force already has the budget, personnel, infrastructure, 
equipment, and existing program policy to absorb and support the Coast Guard’s 
aviation-oriented volunteers. Second, the Air force already has the federal-lead and 
authority to perform volunteer-supported search and rescue in Alaska’s maritime 
environment, while the Coast Guard has no volunteer aviation program in Alaska. Third, 
and most importantly, Air Force leadership has presented to Coast Guard leadership that 
the Air Force can provide mission-specific volunteer aviation services to the Coast  
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Guard, on a cost-per-hour rate that is comparable to what the Coast Guard is already 
paying to maintain a lesser-equipped in-house program. These are discussed below and 
summarized in Table 8. 
In Canada, the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA) is a federally 
incorporated not-for-profit volunteer association, “created to coordinate the training of 
volunteers to augment the [Canadian Forces] primary [Search and Rescue] resources in 
conducting searches and to assist [Transport Canada] in aviation safety and related 
accident prevention activities.”119 CASARA consists of 2,596 certified pilots, navigators, 
and spotters, and 375 privately owned aircraft.120 CASARA is managed and directed by 
Director Canadian Air Force Readiness, is funded by both the Department of National 
Defence [sic] (DND)/Canadian Forces (CF) and Transport Canada (TC), and is tasked by 
the three regionally-focused national Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC).121 
CASARA is a single organization and provides all volunteer aviation support to the 
Canadian government through thirteen provincially/territorially aligned “zones.” While 
funded from its two primary customers (DND/CF and TC), CASARA is trained and 
managed by Canada’s aviation experts in the Canadian Air Force (a sub-agency of 
DND/CF), and tasked by centralized SAR-focused national rescue coordination centers. 
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) also has an all-volunteer Auxiliary component, similar 
to the U.S. Coast Guard. The difference is the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary (CCGA) 
has no aviation component. CASARA provides volunteer aviation support in both inland 
and coastal/maritime environments.  
All three of these volunteer aviation organizations have virtually identical mission 
tasking and membership demographics. However, CASARA and CAP are 
programmatically overseen by incorporated full-time aviation professionals (long-term 
career civilian managers) and funded by their respective nation’s Air Force, while the 
                                                 
119 Canadian Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces, Chief Review Services, “Summative 
Evaluation of the Contribution to the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association–CASARA (1258-144-2 
CRS,” April 2009, ii/iii http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2009/124P0864-eng.aspx. 
120 Civil Air Search and Rescue Association, “Who We Are,” http://www.casara.ca/. 
121 Canadian Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces, Chief Review Services, “Summative 
Evaluation of the Contribution to the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association–CASARA (1258-144-2 
CRS,” 3/19. 
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Auxiliary aviation program is more of a footnote to a maritime-focused military service, 
the Coast Guard, and managed by (transient) active duty Coast Guard personnel who 
typically are not aviators. In Canada, there is never a doubt as to whom to contact when 
volunteer resources are appropriate for a mission; CCGA provides boats and boat crew 
personnel, and CASARA provides aircraft and aircrew personnel. In the U.S., depending 
on the circumstances—and who received the call—either CAP or Auxiliary aviators 
could be tasked. 
The Coast Guard and the Air Force share the nation’s Search and Rescue (SAR) 
responsibilities. The “National Search and Rescue Plan for the United States—2007” 
divides the U.S. into three regions: The Air Force is the SAR coordinator for the 
aeronautical Search and Rescue region corresponding to the continental U.S.; Pacific 
Command—the Air Force indirectly—is responsible for Alaska; the Coast Guard is the 
SAR coordinator for the aeronautical Search and Rescue region of Hawaii and the U.S. 
“maritime regions.”122 
The Coast Guard conducted 20,510 SAR cases in FY 2011 (October 01, 2010—
September 30, 2011).123 During that same FY 2011 time period, the Coast Guard 
Auxiliary aviation component reported assisting in 174 SAR cases.124 Therefore, the 
Auxiliary aviation program participated in 0.83% of all Coast Guard SAR during FY 
2011. The Air Force recently reported that the CAP performed “…90% of continental 
U.S. inland search and rescue missions as tasked by the AFRCC [Air Force Rescue 
Coordination Center]…” during 2011 (it is unclear whether that represents FY or 
calendar year). Note: This differs slightly from the 85% reported by CAP. Actual mission 
                                                 
122 United States Coast Guard, “The National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States–Updated 
2007,” U.S. National Search and Rescue Committee Interagency Agreement, 2007, 7, 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/manuals/Natl_SAR_Plan(2007).pdf. 
123 U.S. Coast Guard, “United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2011 Performance Report,” December 
2011, 27. 
124 AUXDATA, Online Database. Auxiliarist activity is recorded through a Coast Guard owned 
internet-interfaced program called AUXDATA. AUXDATA forwards reported information, scrubbed of 
any personal information, to another internet-based program called AUXINFO. Anyone can access the U.S. 
Coast Guard Auxiliary statistical information captured in AUXINFO at 
https://www.auxinfo.uscg.gov/cognos/cgi-bin/upfcgi.exe . 
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numbers were not reported.125 However, AFRCC reports that the average overall number 
of annual missions tasked between 2001 and 2010 was 2,309.126 Therefore, one can 
estimate that CAP was likely tasked with approximately 90% of them, or 2,078 SAR 
cases during 2011—twelve times as many cases, and 108 times the comparative 
percentage of SAR tasking as Coast Guard Auxiliary aviators. 
The Coast Guard database Patrol Order Management System, which is used to 
reimburse volunteer patrol expenses, indicates 20,757 hours of actual aircraft operation 
during FY 2011.127 Additionally, Auxiliary aviation program members logged 50,167 
volunteer-hours in FY 2011 (this figure reflects the fact that there is often more than one 
person aboard an aircraft and also includes non-airborne program-related hours). Of those 
volunteer-hours, 24,090 were reported as SAR Stand-by (on-call but not performing any 
duties); 750 volunteer-hours were spent actually performing the reported 174 SAR cases. 
Another 18,699 hours were reported as “Maritime Observation Mission” (MOM).128 
MOM is what it implies, a non-specific general observation mission. Auxiliary aircraft 
are standard, privately owned, civil aviation platforms with no imaging or observation-
improving technology other than the cameras and binoculars a volunteer may carry with 
him/her aloft—unless a volunteer installs a technology package at his/her own expense. If 
one were to remove the SAR stand-by hours, MOM represents 72% of the Auxiliary 
aviation program activity. Seventy-two percent of the Auxiliary volunteer time is spent 
“generally observing”—at great expense to the government—with reportedly limited 
tangible returns.129 Four other missions, “logistics, training, marine safety, and ice 
reconnaissance” round out the remaining 7,300 hours.130 Worth noting, Auxiliary  
 
                                                 
125 1st Air Force, “Civil Air Patrol, CONR Converge for Conference,” January 23, 2012, 
http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123287077. 
126 1st Air Force, “Air Force Rescue Coordination Center, 2010 Annual Report,” (n.d.), 
http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-110421-016.pdf, 5. 
127 Timothy J. Hudson, e-mail message to author, March 12, 2012. 
128 AUXDATA, Online Database. 
129 First-hand reporting through personal conversations between numerous Coast Guard pilots and the 
Author. Various Dates between September 2009 and February 2012. 
130 AUXDATA, Online Database. 
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aviation assets are regularly used by Coast Guard Flag Officers as “shuttles” to various 
locations. These hours are not directly captured as a category and are otherwise reported 
as other operationally oriented mission hours.131  
Auxiliary aviation program members and their aircraft are administratively 
attached to a local Auxiliary “flotilla,” a grouping of typically twenty to thirty members. 
There are over 1,000 flotillas nationwide, of which only several dozen include Auxiliary 
Aviation participants.132 Their operational tasking and oversight is provided by the 
nearest of 18 Coast Guard air stations. There is no Auxiliary aviation program in Alaska. 
The CAP maintains 550 corporately owned, federally funded, civil aircraft for its 
volunteers to operate. Many of these platforms are fitted and equipped with advanced 
surveillance and communication equipment such as 100 “Advanced Digital Imagery 
Systems,” and 15 “geo-referenced hyperspectral and panchromatic imagery systems.”133 
These systems are supported and maintained by a fully staffed “CAP National 
Technology Center.”134 There are approximately 1,600 CAP units, located throughout the 
nation—including Alaska and Hawaii. CAP receives operational tasking (only) from the 
CAP National Operations Center (NOC) located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.135 
Referring to previously presented information, of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s FY 2012 $57.0B budget; the Coast Guard’s portion was $6.2B. Of that, 
$17.4M was allocated to the Auxiliary program.136 In relative terms, 0.25%, or $1 out of 
every $392 funded to the Coast Guard supports its volunteer program. Of the Auxiliary 
program funding, approximately one-sixth, or $3.2M, is expended to support the aviation 
sub-program; this figure includes $1.0M Aviation SAMA, which presently is not funded 
                                                 
131 First-hand reporting through personal conversations between several Coast Guard regional 
Directors of Auxiliary and the Author. Various Dates between September 2009 and February 2012. 
132 AUXDATA, Online Database. 
133 Civil Air Patrol, “Civil Air Patrol CAPabilities Handbook, Revision 2,” August 1, 2010. 
134 Civil Air Patrol National Technology Center, “What is the National Technology Center?” (n.d.), 
https://ntc.cap.af.mil/whatis.htm. 
135 U.S. Air Force Archive, “Civil Air Patrol Fact Sheet,” (n.d.), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080409162942/http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=163. 
136 U.S. Coast Guard, Auxiliary Division (CG-BSX-1), “USCG AUX-101 Brief 03Jan12”. 
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in the Auxiliary program’s base budget.137 There are 74 active duty and civilian Coast 
Guard members managing the entire Auxiliary, seven at Coast Guard headquarters and 
67 at 14 different regional offices. Management of the aviation sub-program amounts to 
an average of about five to 6% of each member’s duties. There are no full-time 
employees dedicated solely to the aviation sub-program.138 
Budget figures from FY 2010 (the most recent data available) indicate that the 
entire Department of Defense budget was $533.8B.139 Of the Air Force’s $115.6B 
portion, $26.6M was allocated to the CAP program.140,141 In relative terms, 0.023%, or 
$1 out of every $4,346 funded to the Air Force, supports its volunteer program. The Civil 
Air Patrol is managed by 116 active duty and civilian Air Force members and 100 
members of the Civil Air Patrol non-profit corporation.142 
Similar to the U.S., Canada divides national SAR responsibilities into three 
regions. Unlike the U.S., Canadian SAR is managed by three central Joint Rescue 
Coordination Centres [sic] (JRCCs). The JRCC Commander is tasked to decide how to 
respond to a situation. If a surface asset (boat) is the appropriate response platform, 
he/she will direct a CCG or a volunteer CCGA asset. If an aviation asset (aircraft) is 
appropriate, he/she will direct a CF or a volunteer CASARA asset. Maritime responses 
that require aviation assets are not necessarily tasked to CCG.143 
The CCG is responsible for the same safety and environmental protection 
missions as the U.S. Coast Guard, and is generally similar in organization and structure. 
                                                 
137 This data was collected from multiple internal funding source documents maintained at Coast 
Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC.  
138 U.S. Coast Guard, Auxiliary Division (CG-BSX-1), “USCG AUX-101 Brief 03Jan12”. 
139 U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Releases Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal,” May 7, 2009, 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12652. 
140 USAF, “Air Force Fiscal 2010 Budget Reflects Rebalanced Priorities,” May 7, 2009, 
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123148160. 
141 Civil Air Patrol. “2010 Financial Report,” (n.d.), 
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142 USAF, “Factsheets: Civil Air Patrol.”  
143 Canadian Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces, Chief Review Services, “Evaluation 
of the CF/DND Component of the National Search and Rescue Program (1258-159 CRS),” January 2008, 
4/15–8/15, http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2008/135P0785-eng.aspx. 
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However, the CCG is not considered a military service; it does not perform any law 
enforcement, and its members are non-military civil servants. The Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, using CCG platforms, are Canada’s territorial maritime law 
enforcers.144 The CCG, which is under the federal department “Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada,” has a comparatively small aviation component of 22 helicopters.145  
The CCGA parallels the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary in its support for its parent 
agency. The CCGA focuses its members’ efforts on maritime SAR. With 4,000 members 
and 1,133 vessels, CCGA reported conducting 1,741 SAR missions in 2010.146 That 
represented approximately 25% of the CCG’s 6,935 SAR missions.147 The CCGA has no 
aviation program. 
In 2004, CASARA flew182 assigned missions, or 26% of all JRCC air tasking.148 
In 2007, CASARA contributed 625 of 3,079 (20%) of all SAR flight hours in Canada 
(the CF flew the other 80%).149 The DND budget for FY 2008/09 was $16.2B (CAD).150 
A Canadian government study went on to state:  
The DND SAR-related program cost in FY 2007/08 was $111,854,136. In 
addition to the $112 million, DND’s portion of the federal contribution to 
CASARA during this same period was $2,206,700. This means that the 
CASARA contribution represents 1.9% of DND’s program costs for 
SAR.151 
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This mini-study has presented a number of data points and statistical information. 
It is organized in Table 8 for simplified review and consideration. 
 
  CASARA CAP AUX Air 
Adult 
Members 2,596 31,000 606 












Mission Hours (Not identified) 111,000 20,757 
Annual SAR 



































"1.9% of CF SAR budget" 
~0.005% of DoD 
~0.023% of USAF 
~0.005% of DHS ~0.047% 
of USCG 
*Unless otherwise noted, the above information was cited earlier in this section. 
Table 8.   Depiction of Volunteer Aviation Program Statistics 
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Canada is a nation of approximately 34.2 Million people.154 Contrasted to the 
United States population of approximately 308.7 Million, Canada’s population is about 
11% of the U.S. population.155 Canada has a similar ratio of aviation-oriented adult 
volunteers (approximately 8% of the combined CAP and Auxiliary Aviation 
membership). While both nations are of relatively similar size in landmass, Canada has 
10 times the coastline as the U.S.156 Much of Canada’s coastline is located in the 
Nation’s sparsely populated arctic region. Nonetheless, Canada has a significant maritime 
coastal region requiring search and rescue response capabilities. 
The Canadian Dollar, in recent years, is very close in value to the U.S. Dollar. As 
of March 11, 2012, $1.00 (U.S.) exchanged for about $1.01 (CAD). So, it is reasonable to 
assess the relative organizational costs similarly. As shown in Table 7, despite the fact 
that the U.S. outspends Canada 30:1 on its military, Canada provides almost three times 
the organizationally proportional financial support to its volunteer aviator program. A 
closer look at the data shows the significantly larger CASARA cost per mission hour 
(approximately double) is countered by the smaller cost per SAR mission. One 
explanation for this could be that CASARA personnel fly fewer mission hours than their 
American counterparts, but more of their missions were oriented toward actual SAR 
response. 
It is also important to keep in mind that members privately own CASARA 
aircraft. The comparatively robust financial support (including personal expense 
reimbursement) for actual SAR missions appears to ensure that the aircraft owners 
continue to volunteer their time and aircraft—at a cost savings to the Canadian taxpayers. 
While CAP corporately owns almost all of its aircraft, it does have provisions to permit 
(and reimburse) members to use privately owned aircraft. At CAP discretion, some Coast  
 
                                                 
154 Statistics Canada, “Canada’s Population Estimates,” March 24, 2011, 
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http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/index.php. 
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Guard Auxiliarists could continue to fly their same aircraft under CAP oversight and 
support and others could train and qualify to fly and continue their volunteer service 
aboard CAP-owned aircraft. 
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APPENDIX C. COMPILATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
PRESENTED IN CHAPTER IV 
A. AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP 
 Finding #1. Auxiliary membership numbers increase and decrease over 
time; Auxiliary membership is generally smaller than the past 40 years, 
but larger than the 30 years before that. National events and Coast Guard 
policies can be found to negatively impact membership over the short 
term. However, those negative impacts are temporary; volunteer interest 
remains and new members are regularly recruited. 
 Finding #2. Volunteer membership in the Auxiliary has been generally 
independent of the trends in national recreational boating registrations. 
Since 2007, Auxiliary membership has grown despite declines in boating 
and boat sales. 
B. AUXILIARIST PARTICIPATION 
 Finding #3. The average duration of Auxiliary Aviation missions is in 
decline while the duration of all other missions is relatively constant.  
 Finding #4. The number of operational hours served and missions 
performed in Surface and Air Operations Support is increasing despite a 
general decline in the number qualified participants. Fewer qualified 
volunteers are reporting more hours and missions. 
 Finding #5. The relatively constant 50-year declining trend in the number 
of surface facilities (boats) is independent of national retail powerboat 
sales and Coast Guard financial support (SAMA). 
 Finding #6. The offering of aircraft for use as Auxiliary facilities is largely 
dependent on the degree of Coast Guard financial subsidization (SAMA) 
and maintenance requirements (TBO). 
 Finding #7. There has been a three-fold increase in the presence of aircraft 
as a percentage of all operational facilities since the institution of aviation 
SAMA in 1997. 
C. AUXILIARY DEMOGRAPHICS 




 Finding #9. The American White population representation is decreasing 
while the three largest American non-White minorities are growing. The 
American Hispanic population representation, which is already the largest 
minority represented in the Auxiliary, is growing rapidly. 
D. AUXILIARY RESOURCING 
 Finding #10. Auxiliary membership administration, the overhead expense 
for managing the organization, consumes approximately half of the direct 
resourcing of the Auxiliary program. 
 Finding #11. The direct funding of the Auxiliary program, when adjusted 
for inflation, has progressively decreased since an infusion immediately 
following 9/11. 
E. AUXILIARY PROGRAM RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
 Finding #12. Auxiliary operational activities—with the exception of Air 
Operations Support—offer significant measured outcomes at minimal per 
unit expense to the Coast Guard, and have a positive volunteer 
involvement return on investment.  
 Finding #13. Air Operations Support has limited measured outcomes and a 
negative volunteer involvement return on investment, yet consumes 12.7% 
of Auxiliary programmatic resourcing. 
F. RESOURCE-NEUTRAL POLICY OPPORTUNITIES 
 Finding #14. The Civil Air Patrol is capable of providing volunteer 
aviation services to the Coast Guard at an as-needed hourly rate 
comparable to those provided by the Auxiliary Aviation sub-program. 
 Finding #15. The Auxiliary program has under-funded demands in both 
general administration and operational programs that could immediately 
use any and all funds reprogrammed from elsewhere within the program. 
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